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I. INTRODUCTION
Frequent use of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organiza-
tions Act of 1970 (RICO)' by government and private litigants has
prompted a chorus of criticism2 during the last five years. This criticism
* Attorney, Asbill, Junkin, Myers & Buffone, Washington, D.C. B.A., McGill University, 1978;
J.D., Georgetown University Law Center, 1982.
1. Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, tit. IX, 84 Stat. 941, 947-48
(1971) (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1988)).
2. See, e.g., Abrams, A New Proposal for Limiting Private Civil RICO, 37 UCLA L. REv. 1
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has not been restricted to the narrow confines of the legal profession;
many respectable newspapers recently have issued calls for the outright
repeal of RICO.3 Attorneys who regularly defend against criminal or
civil RICO allegations cannot take credit for the increasing dissatisfac-
tion with RICO. Rather, it is the successes, and indeed the excesses, of
RICO's proponents that have tarnished the statute's image.4
RICO's revolutionary application to increasingly broad areas of
human conduct has unsettled jurists, lawyers, and laypersons.5 Al-
though Congress was driven in 1970 to devise a cure for the disease of
organized crime, RICO has been applied almost exclusively in other
contexts." While Congress often has enacted legislation that has unin-
tended consequences, the gap between the legislative goals of RICO and
its practical impact is dramatic, and these unintended consequences
continue to mount.
(1989); Lacovara & Aronow, The Legal Shakedown of Legitimate Business People: The Runaway
Provisions of Private Civil RICO, 21 NEw ENG. L. REV. 1 (1985); see also Oversight on Civil RICO:
Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 632 (1985) [hereinafter
Senate RICO Hearings] (statement of Edward I. O'Brien, President of the Securities Industry
Association) (suggesting that "the private right of action in RICO is not essential for redressing
wrongs, since there are ample remedies existing in both federal and state law").
3. Can RICO Be Reformed? (editorial), Richmond Times-Dispatch, Nov. 6, 1989, at A16, col.
1 (proposing that RICO be repealed); Giuliani's Legacy (editorial), Wall St. J., Oct. 25, 1989, at
A18, col. 1 (stating that "only the complete repeal of RICO can guarantee an end to injustices in
its name"); It's Time to Rescind RICO (editorial), L.A. Times, Aug. 16, 1989, at B6, col. 1.
4. Two areas of abuse alleged frequently are the use of RICO for malicious prosecution and
the abuse of the RICO statutory scheme. See generally Goldsmith, Civil RICO Abuse: The Allega-
tions in Context, 1986 B.Y.U. L. REV. 55, 66-84.
5. See, e.g., Rehnquist, Reforming Diversity Jurisdiction and Civil RICO, 21 ST. MARY'S L.J.
5 (1989) (originally presented at the Brookings Institution's Eleventh Seminar on the Administra-
tion of Justice, Apr. 7, 1989); A.BA. SECTION OF CORP., BANKING & BUSINESS LAW REPORT OF THE
AD Hoc CIVIL RICO TASK FORCE 4-5 (1985) [hereinafter ABA RICO REPORT]; Hentoff, RICO
Stalks the Press, VILLAGE VOICE, Oct. 17, 1989, at 22. Donald Egan, Counsel for the defendant in
Haroco v. American Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 747 F.2d 384 (7th Cir. 1984), aff'd, 473 U.S. 606
(1985), suggests the broad application of RICO to cases beyond Congress's intent burdens the
courts and increases the costs to civil litigants. Senate RICO Hearings, supra note 2, at 648. Egan
noted:
An attorney is not "abusing" civil RICO if he creatively applies the expansive language to
circumstances which Congress did not contemplate. Rather, he is using his skills as an advo-
cate to represent his client in the best possible manner. It is up to Congress to draft the
statute so it cannot be misapplied.
Id. at 647.
6. See Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 499 (1985) (acknowledging that private
civil RICO actions "are being brought almost exclusively against such defendants [respected and
legitimate enterprises], rather than against the archetypal, intimidating mobster"). RICO viola-
tions have been raised in a variety of contexts. See, e.g., McLendon v. Continental Group, Inc., 602
F. Supp. 1492 (D.N.J. 1985) (employment grievance); White v. Fosco, 599 F. Supp. 710 (D.D.C.
1984) (attorney-client conflicts); Congregation Beth Yitzhok v. Briskman, 566 F. Supp. 555
(E.D.N.Y. 1983) (dispute over entitlement to Hassidic Jewish leadership position); Barker v. Un-
derwriters at Lloyd's London, 564 F. Supp. 352 (E.D. Mich. 1983) (refusal to pay insurance claim);
Pit Pros, Inc. v. Wolf, 554 F. Supp. 284 (N.D. Ill. 1983) (dispute between landlord and tenant).
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As RICO enters its third decade, it stands before the court of pub-
lic opinion, indicted but not convicted. The charges against RICO come
from all quarters. Repeal or meaningful reform is necessary. Clearly, it
is time to reconsider RICO, its purposes, and its effects.
Part II of this Article briefly will examine RICO's short history to
identify both intended and unintended developments in its evolution
and to highlight some areas that have given rise to public concern over
RICO's growth. Part III of this Article will address the political and
policy implications of these developments. Finally, after concluding
that no satisfactory political resolution is likely, Part IV of this Article
will suggest that the "void for vagueness" doctrine should play a signifi-
cant role in repealing RICO or in restricting its currently overbroad
reach.
II. THE ORIGINS OF THE CONTROVERSY OVER Rico
When Congress considered RICO in 1969 and 1970, the proposed
bill's objective was as clear as its name: The Organized Crime Control
Act of 1970. 7 Congress, however, could not draft statutory language pro-
scribing membership in organized crime because of constitutional
prohibitions against status offenses and because of vagueness concerns.
Apparently aware of these obstacles to a direct prohibition of organized
crime, Congress chose indirect means to reach organized crime. Con-
gress drafted a statute that singled out certain types of criminal activ-
ity, designated as "racketeering activity," and imposed severe sanctions
on those who committed a pattern of these offenses.8 Congress, how-
ever, was not attempting merely to create another penalty provision for
recidivists.' Rather, Congress was attempting to protect legitimate busi-
nesses from the unhealthy influence of organized crime as revealed by
previous congressional investigations. 10
Precluded from directly criminalizing membership in organized
crime, Congress chose to attack organized crime indirectly in 1970 by
preventing it from gaining a foothold in legitimate business.11 The de-
vice Congress employed, RICO, reached only conduct that already was
prohibited by the criminal code. RICO's novel contribution cohsisted of
7. Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922 (1970) (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1988)).
8. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1962-1964 (1988).
9. See United States v. Bledsoe, 674 F.2d 647, 659 (8th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S.
1040 (1983).
10. Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922-23 (1970); S. REP. No. 617, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1969)
(stating that the purpose of the act is "to seek the eradication of organized crime in the United
States").
11. See Lynch, RICO: The Crime of Being a Criminal (pts. 1 & 2), 87 COLUM. L. REv. 661,
674-78 (1987) (stating that the legislative objective of RICO was to prevent infiltration of legiti-
mate business by organized crime).
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elevating certain types of criminal conduct to a new level of culpability
when the conduct had a corrupting influence on legitimate business.
Driven by constitutional fears to seek neutral statutory language to
mask the ultimate objective of eradicating the Mafia, Congress used
three key concepts to define this new crime.
First, Congress identified twenty-four federal and eight state of-
fenses as the hallmarks of organized crime.12 These selected criminal
offenses were labeled "racketeering activity" in RICO and became
known as predicate acts for RICO liability.1 " Second, Congress deter-
mined that RICO liability would be imposed only for committing a pat-
tern of such racketeering acts, or in rare cases, for a single collection of
an unlawful debt.' 4 Finally, this predicate criminal conduct had to cor-
rupt an enterprise. 5 These three core elements-predicate activity, the
pattern of such activity, and the affected enterprise-constitute the
principal means by which Congress intended to distinguish the racket-
eer from the mere criminal.
By enacting RICO, the ninety-first Congress did not stop at creat-
ing a new crime; it also fashioned unprecedented sanctions for violating
this crime. Congress added criminal forfeiture to the federal criminal
code as a RICO sanction.16 RICO's forfeiture provisions not only au-
thorize the government to confiscate the spoils of racketeering, but also
enable the government to seize a defendant's assets that provided a
source of influence over a corrupted legitimate enterprise, even if the
assets were earned legitimately.'7 The forfeiture of wholly legitimate as-
sets was justified as necessary to achieve RICO's purgative goals: racke-
teers and any economic influence they might hold over an enterprise
must be purged from the enterprise. 8 Congress also enacted provisions
for private enforcement of RICO, promising treble damages and attor-
12. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1) (1982); White Collar Crime: Second Annual Survey of Law, 19 AM.
CRIM. L. REV. 173, 351 (1981) [hereinafter White Collar Crime].
13. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1) (1988); CRIMINAL Div., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, RACKETEER INFLUENCED
AND CORRUPT ORGANIZATIONS (RICO): A MANUAL FOR FEDERAL PROSECUTORS 6 (1988) (stating that
"listed crimes are often informally called 'predicate crimes,' because they make up the 'predicate'
for a RICO violation").
14. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a)-(d) (1988). "Pattern of Racketeering activity" is defined in id. §
1961(5).
15. See id. § 1962(a)-(c). In passing the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act,
Congress used the statutory term "enterprise" to designate those entities it was attempting to
protect from organized crime. Id. § 1961(4).
16. Id. § 1963(a).
17. Id. §§ 1962-1963; see United States v. Marubeni Am. Corp., 611 F.2d 763, 769 n.12 (9th
Cir. 1980).
18. See Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922-23 (1970) (outlining the goals of RICO); see also
Marubeni Am. Corp., 611 F.2d at 769 n.11; 115 CONG. REC. 9567 (1969) (statement of Sen. John L.
McClellan) (stating that forfeiture will "remove the organized crime element from a particular
field of activity, as well as the illegal profit potential").
[Vol. 43:691
THE DEFENSE CASE
ney's fees to those who successfully prosecuted such "civil" RICO
claims. 9 Wittingly or not, Congress created powerful financial incen-
tives for aggressive use of RICO by government counsel and their pri-
vate surrogates by offering broad forfeitures in criminal RICO cases and
treble damages in civil RICO cases.
The dramatic increase in the use of RICO in criminal and civil
prosecutions beginning in the early 1980s20 can be explained, in part, by
the lure of financial rewards that RICO offers. The predominant reason
for the increased use of RICO, however, lies in the elasticity of RICO's
limiting principles of "predicate" acts, a "pattern" of racketeering con-
duct, and an involved "enterprise." While these terms were meant to
distinguish between the common criminal and the organized criminal,
they were not equal to the task. Accordingly, RICO's perceived and ac-
tual overbreadth can be traced directly to the failure of these statutory
terms to place meaningful limits on RICO's reach in either criminal or
civil prosecutions.
Congress and the courts share the blame for the ineffectiveness of
RICO's three core elements as restrictions on RICO's application. Con-
gress is culpable because it drafted these limiting provisions in vague
and broad language with little or no elaboration furnished by RICO's
definitional sections." Defenders of this imprecise drafting suggest that
Congress made RICO overinclusive in order to afford maximum
prosecutorial flexibility in rooting out the intended target of organized
crime. 2 Under this explanation, Congress meant to offset RICO's over-
inclusive character by allowing prosecutorial discretion to limit RICO's
application to the group Congress clearly intended to target: organized
crime. Under this view, although Congress employed a shotgun style in
drafting the statute, it clearly was relying on the Justice Department to
apply RICO in a discriminating fashion consistent with RICO's an-
nounced objective of eradicating organized crime.23
Whether or not this reliance on the Justice Department to narrow
RICO was justified, Congress clearly must shoulder the blame for enact-
ing an overbroad penal statute in 1970. Congress subsequently exacer-
19. 18 U.S.C. § 1965(c) (1988).
20. See ABA RICO REPORT, supra note 5, at 1-2, 55 (providing statistical analysis of the
increase in civil RICO prosecutions between 1970 and 1984); see also White Collar Crime, supra
note 12, at 353 n.112; Rehnquist, supra note 5, at 9 (noting that civil RICO filings have increased
eight-fold from 1983 to 1988).
21. See 18 U.S.C. § 1961 (1988).
22. See Blakey & Gettings, RICO: Basic Concepts-Criminal and Civil Remedies, 53 TEMP.
L.Q. 1009, 1017 n.45 (1980); Goldmsith, Civil RICO Reform: The Basics for Compromise, 71 MINN.
L. REV. 827, 831 & n.24 (1987); Goldsmith, Civil RICO Abuse: The Allegations in Context, 1986
B.Y.U. L. REv. 55, 73-75.
23. See Lacovara & Aronow, supra note 2, at 2.
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bated the problem in 1984, 1986, 1988, and 1989 when it added new
predicate offenses, including such broad offenses as credit card fraud,
money laundering, obscenity, and bank fraud to the growing list of
racketeering acts triggering a RICO violation.24
Federal courts are also responsible for RICO's broad reach. When
criminal prosecutors first used RICO in the late 1970s, federal courts
interpreted RICO's three core elements expansively. 5 This early liberal
construction of RICO's scope by federal judges in criminal cases gradu-
ally overcame prosecutors' initial hesitancy to tackle RICO's unfamiliar
and complex terminology. By 1980, RICO was a familiar and potent
weapon in a federal prosecutor's arsenal. Despite an occasional judicial
warning to prosecutors not to invoke RICO too lightly,26 courts regu-
larly rejected efforts to interpret narrowly RICO's three core elements.
For its part, the Justice Department nurtured RICO's warm judicial re-
ception by instituting internal approval requirements for RICO prose-
cutions, which ensured that courts would not be deciding the proper
scope of RICO in cases with sympathetic defendants." Hence, courts
initially addressed the question of RICO's proper scope in a series of
24. Pub. L. No. 101-73, 103 Stat. 183, 506 (1989) (relating to financial institution fraud); Pub.
L. No. 100-690, 102 Stat. 4181, 4402 (1988) (relating to offenses relating to sexual exploitation,
fraud, the use of interstate commerce facilities in the commission of murder-for-hire, and the sex-
ual exploitation of children); Pub. L. No. 99-646, 100 Stat. 3592 (1986) (as amended by Pub. L. No.
100-690, 102 Stat. 4181 (1988)) (relating to tampering with a witness, victim, or informant and to
the obstruction of state or local law enforcement); Pub. L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207 (1986) (relat-
ing to laundering of monetary instruments); Pub. L. No. 98-547, 98 Stat. 2754, 2770 (1984) (relat-
ing to interstate transportation of stolen motor vehicles); Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1837, 2143
(1984) (relating to obscene matter).
25. See, e.g., United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 593 (1981) (concluding that wholly
illegitimate businesses can constitute RICO enterprises); United States v. Elliott, 571 F.2d 880, 899
(5th Cir.) (holding that two brothers constituted a "loosely connected" criminal network sufficient
to serve as an enterprise), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 953 (1978); United States v. Moeller, 402 F. Supp.
49, 58 (D. Conn. 1975) (determining that two acts, arson and kidnapping, that occurred in the
course of a single episode, established the requisite RICO pattern).
26. See United States v. Thordarson, 646 F.2d 1323, 1328-29 n.10 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 454
U.S. 1055 (1981); United States v. Weisman, 624 F.2d 1118, 1123 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S.
871 (1981); United States v. Huber, 603 F.2d 387, 395-96 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 927
(1980).
27. See, e.g., Turkette, 452 U.S. at 576 (defining "enterprise" broadly); Weisman, 624 F.2d at
1118 (defining "pattern" broadly); United States v. Frumento, 563 F.2d 1083, 1086-89 (3d Cir.
1977) (concluding that a prior acquittal of a state offense is no bar to use as a RICO predicate),
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1072 (1978); United States v. Forsythe, 560 F.2d 1127, 1134-35 (3d Cir. 1977)
(noting that state predicates generically encompass all such state offenses); United States v.
Hawes, 529 F.2d 472, 479 (5th Cir. 1976) (acknowledging that "Congress gave the term 'enterprise'
a very broad meaning"); Moeller, 402 F. Supp. at 55-56 (noting that the "common sense interpre-
tation of the word 'pattern' implies acts occurring in different criminal episodes," but refusing to
narrow the pattern requirement accordingly).
28. See CRIMINAL Div., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS' MANUAL § 9-110
(1989) [hereinafter U.SA.M.].
696
THE DEFENSE CASE
large scale drug2" and public corruption 0 prosecutions.
A. Predicate Offenses Under RICO
In the context of the early drug and public corruption prosecutions,
federal courts had little difficulty in approving expansive interpreta-
tions of RICO's predicate offenses. Even in cases when the alleged crim-
inal misconduct did not fit squarely within RICO's list of predicate
offenses, federal courts upheld prosecutors' efforts to expand this list
through creative use of the mail or wire fraud predicate offenses. For
example, although criminal tax fraud is not a RICO predicate offense,
the government successfully has prosecuted several defendants under
RICO by recasting tax violations as violations of the mail or wire fraud
statutes, which are RICO predicates."
B. RICO's Pattern Element
The proper limitation of RICO's pattern element has been litigated
frequently. Initially, the pattern element was construed broadly in
criminal RICO prosecutions, reflecting a general judicial receptiveness
to the use of criminal RICO.2 RICO's statutory definition of "pattern"
merely requires proof of more than one predicate offense within a ten
year period,33 and early RICO opinions in criminal cases required either
proof of only two offenses or, at most, that two offenses somehow be
related to each other in a logical manner3 4 or to the alleged enterprise.35
After private plaintiffs increasingly began to use civil RICO in the mid-
1980s, federal courts, at the urging of the Supreme Court, began to re-
consider their prior expansive construction of RICO's pattern element.
29. See, e.g., United States v. Elliott, 571 F.2d 880 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 953
(1978).
30. See, e.g., United States v. Sutherland, 656 F.2d 1181 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455
U.S. 949 (1982); United States v. Lee Stoller Enters., 652 F.2d 1313 (7th Cir.) (en banc), cert.
denied, 454 U.S. 1082 (1981).
31. See, e.g., United States v. Porcelli, 865 F.2d 1352 (2d Cir. 1989); United States v. Busher,
817 F.2d 1409 (9th Cir. 1987); see also Illinois Dep't of Revenue v. Phillips, 771 F.2d 312 (7th Cir.
1985).
32. See, e.g., Weisman, 624 F.2d at 1122 (concluding that predicate acts need not be related
to each other to constitute a pattern, but that acts merely must be done in the conduct of the
enterprise's affairs to be a pattern, and expressly rejecting the contention that pattern definition in
18 U.S.C. § 3575 (1988) is applicable to pattern definition in 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4) (1988)); United
States v. Starnes, 644 F.2d 673, 677-78 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 826 (1977) (holding that
"pattern" merely requires proof of two acts connected in some logical manner); see also supra note
5 and accompanying text.
33. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5) (1988).
34. Starnes, 644 F.2d at 677-78; United States v. Kaye, 556 F.2d 855, 860-61 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 921 (1977).
35. United States v. Bright, 630 F.2d 804, 830 n.47 (5th Cir. 1980); Weisman, 624 F.2d at
1122-23.
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In the now famous footnote fourteen in Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co. 36
the Supreme Court identified the failure of lower courts to fashion a
"meaningful concept of pattern" as the cause of civil RICO's
overbreadth.37
The Sedima majority opinion failed to note, however, that RICO's
pattern element originally was defined in criminal RICO prosecutions
and that a meaningful definition of pattern was not articulated in these
early criminal cases. Indeed, prior to Sedima, most lower courts were
unaware that anything was amiss in their understanding of what consti-
tuted a pattern of racketeering activity.38 After Sedima, these early,
broad precedents defining criminal RICO pattern would prove problem-
atic for a judiciary bent on pruning back civil RICO.39 Some lower
courts tried to avoid the broad "pattern" definition by holding that pat-
tern definitions formulated in criminal RICO opinions were not binding
in civil RICO cases. These courts thus endorsed a broad pattern defini-
tion for criminal RICO cases and a different, narrower pattern defini-
tion for civil RICO cases.4 ° This indefensible articulation of a double
standard for a RICO pattern ultimately was repudiated;"1 it is sympto-
matic, however, of a general judicial willingness to tolerate RICO's over-
breadth in a criminal context but not when applied in a civil
prosecution.
The most recent judicial comment on RICO's pattern element
came in 1989 when the Supreme Court addressed the competing defini-
tions crafted by the appellate courts after Sedima. In H.J. Inc. v.
Northwestern Bell Telephone Co. 42 a majority of the Supreme Court
held that a RICO pattern is established when the defendant's predicate
offenses are related and continuous or at least pose the threat of con-
tinuity.43 The H.J. Inc. majority appropriated the pattern relationship
36. 473 U.S. 479 (1985).
37. Id. at 496 n.14.
38. See, e.g., United States v. Morris, 532 F.2d 436, 442 (5th Cir. 1976) (holding that playing
several illegal card games within 19 months was not "sporadic"); United States v. Fineman, 434 F.
Supp. 189, 193-94 (E.D. Pa. 1977) (holding that accepting four bribes over a 30-month period
constituted a pattern).
39. See, e.g., United States v. Ianniello, 808 F.2d 184 (2d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 483 U.S.
1006 (1987), overruled, United States v. Indelicato, 865 F.2d 1370 (2d Cir. 1989); R.A.G.S. Couture,
Inc. v. Hyatt, 774 F.2d 1350, 1355 (5th Cir. 1985).
40. See, e.g., Franklin & Joseph, Inc. v. Continental Health Indus., Inc., 664 F. Supp. 719,
723 (S.D.N.Y. 1987); Shopping Mall Investors, N.V. v. E.G. Frances & Co., No. 84 Civ. 1469 (JFK)
(S.D.N.Y. Jan. 29, 1987) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file). This double standard is at odds with
longstanding canons of interpretation favoring narrow interpretation of penal laws.
41. See Beck v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co., 820 F.2d 46, 51-52 (2d Cir. 1987), cert.
denied, 484 U.S. 1005 (1988).
42. 109 S. Ct. 2893 (1989).
43. Id. at 2902.
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test from the definition provided by the ninety-first Congress in an-
other title of the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970,44 instead of us-
ing the statutory pattern definition provided by Congress for RICO.45
In a pointed concurring opinion, Justice Scalia, writing for four Jus-
tices, observed that the absence of such a statutory definition for the
"pattern" element in RICO normally would suggest that Congress did
not intend to apply this unrelated definition to RICO.46 Because even
the H.J. Inc. majority acknowledged that the concepts of continuity
and relationship are ill-formed and must await further judicial elabora-
tion,47 it should be obvious that RICO's pattern element is not effective
as a principle of limitation. If anything, the H.J. Inc. majority's deferral
of a specific pattern definition for future elaboration on a case-by-case
basis strongly suggests that courts will continue to tolerate broad pat-
tern allegations in criminal cases while enforcing much narrower defini-
tions in civil cases.
C. RICO Enterprises
RICO's enterprise element has fared even worse than the pattern
element as a means of limiting the statute's reach. In many respects,
this is RICO's greatest failure because the "enterprise" concept was
RICO's singular contribution to criminal law.48 Congress enacted RICO
primarily to combat enterprise criminality: the notion of enterprise
criminality, of mobsters infiltrating a legitimate business and cor-
rupting it, was the primary reason for enacting RICO.49 Just as the so-
cial dangers posed by concerted action gave rise to conspiracy doctrine,
the perceived dangers of enterprise criminality were asserted by RICO's
proponents as the justification for such strong, purgative measures.50
RICO's enterprise element, however, no longer significantly limits
RICO's reach.
As originally formulated, RICO's "enterprise" element reflected
Congress's general intent to prevent organized crime from infiltrating
legitimate businesses. Hence, Congress defined the enterprise element
for a RICO prosecution in terms of the entities to be protected: corpo-
rations, partnerships, and unions.51
44. See 18 U.S.C. § 3575(e) (1988) (partially repealed 1984).
45. H.J. Inc., 109 S. Ct. at 2900-01.
46. Id. at 2907.
47. Id. at 2902.
48. Blakey & Gettings, supra note 22, at 1013-14.
49. See Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922-23 (1970); see also S. REP. No. 617, supra note 10, at
76; Lynch, supra note 11, at 678 (parsing legislative history to conclude that the purpose of RICO
is the elimination of the inflitration of organized crime into legitimate entities).
50. See Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922-23 (1970).
51. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4) (1988).
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In 1981 the Supreme Court, in United States v. Turkette,2 held
that RICO's enterprise element included not only legitimate businesses
but also wholly illegitimate associations of individuals or entities.5 3 Af-
ter Turkette, RICO encompassed prosecutions of individuals who asso-
ciate solely to conduct criminal behavior, indicating that criminal
groups can constitute a RICO enterprise. As a result, enterprise allega-
tions in RICO cases are limited only by the ingenuity of prosecuting
counsel because almost any combination of individuals or entities can
serve as an enterprise. 4 Enterprise allegations largely are driven by the
financial incentives that RICO offers. In criminal prosecutions the gov-
ernment invariably adopts an enterprise allegation calculated to maxi-
mize its potential forfeiture recovery, often by alleging that a legal
entity is the enterprise and then confiscating the defendant's interests,
however acquired, in this legal entity. Private plaintiffs create elaborate
combinations of associated individuals or legal entities and expediently
label them as enterprises in their campaign to find a pocket deep
enough to pay treble damages.5
D. The Consequences of RICO's Overbreadth
Because Congress and the federal courts have failed to limit RICO,
the statute has grown more expansive. This growth has resulted in a
variety of controversial developments.
1. RICO "Megatrials"
Criminal RICO prosecutions have become more commonplace, and
any major criminal prosecution is likely to include a RICO count re-
gardless of the subject matter of the alleged wrongdoing. RICO's versa-
tility has allowed RICO prosecutions for tax,56 securities,5 commodities,
and bankruptcy fraud58 as well as for obscenity, 59 drug,60 or gambling
52. 452 U.S. 576 (1981).
53. Id. at 580.
54. See, e.g., United States v. Porcelli, 856 F.2d 1352, 1363-64 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 110 S.
Ct. 53 (1989); United States v. Thevis, 665 F.2d 616, 625 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 825
(1982); General Accident Ins. Co. v. Fidelity & Deposit Co., 598 F. Supp. 1223, 1243 (E.D. Pa.
1984).
55. See, e.g., Casperone v. Landmark Oil & Gas Corp., 819 F.2d 112, 115 (5th Cir. 1987)
(holding that an enterprise consists of a corporation, its president, and its attorney).
56. United States v. Busher, 817 F.2d 1409 (9th Cir. 1987); United States v. Standard Dry
Wall Corp., 617 F. Supp. 1283 (E.D.N.Y. 1985).
57. United States v. Bledsoe, 674 F.2d 647 (8th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1040 (1983);
United States v. Pray, 452 F. Supp. 788 (M.D. Pa. 1978).
58. United States v. Tashjian, 660 F.2d 829 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1102 (1981);
United States v. Weisman, 624 F.2d 1118 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 871 (1980).
59. United States v. Pryba, 674 F. Supp. 1504 (E.D. Va. 1987).
60. United States v. Schell, 775 F.2d 559 (4th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1098 (1986).
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violations.6 1
Criminal RICO prosecutions also have spawned the RICO "mega-
trial," the government prosecution of a dozen or more RICO defendants
in a single proceeding that lasts many months. The longest federal
criminal case, a twenty-one month trial, was a RICO megatrial.2 These
megatrials tax juries, judges, and defendants alike. Juries are asked to
absorb months of testimony and volumes of evidence and then make
numerous detailed factual findings necessary for a RICO verdict.
Judges are asked to preside over mammoth trials and then instruct the
jury in concepts that legal scholars find incomprehensible. For the
RICO defendant caught up in these proceedings, the process itself is a
form of punishment, made worse by the financial burden of legal fees.
2. RICO Forfeitures
RICO's forfeiture provisions6" have changed the landscape of crimi-
nal litigation. Under RICO, prior to filing criminal charges the govern-
ment can threaten to impoverish defendants by stripping them of their
ill-gotten wealth and their legitimately gained resources. Prior to trial,
the government routinely takes the position, for example, that a de-
fendant's past salary and future pension benefits from a company
dubbed a RICO enterprise are subject to forfeiture under RICO.6' Stock
or other interests the defendant has in the business are also subject to
forfeiture. 5
The broad RICO forfeiture is unique because it requires a defend-
ant to forfeit any property interest, however legitimate, to the govern-
ment if that interest affords the defendant a source of influence over
the alleged RICO enterprise. 6 RICO subjects a defendant's legitimately
accumulated wealth to forfeiture solely because the defendant owns this
wealth as a part of an interest in a legitimate business enterprise. For
example, in United States v. Porcelli7 the Second Circuit upheld the
forfeiture of a chain of gas stations, totalling twenty-nine separate cor-
porations, owned and operated by the defendant. Mr. Porcelli forfeited
these properties to the federal government because he was convicted
under RICO for failure to pay state sales taxes to New York for gaso-
61. United States v. Ruggiero, 754 F.2d 927 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1127 (1985).
62. See United States v. Acceturo, Crim. No. 85-292 (D. N.J. 1985) (acquittal).
63. 18 U.S.C. § 1963 (1988).
64. See, e.g., United States v. Horak, 833 F.2d 1235, 1242-43 (7th Cir. 1987); United States v.
Regan, No. 88-Cr.-517 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 27, 1989).
65. See Porcelli, 865 F.2d at 1352; United States v. Cauble, 706 F.2d 1322 (5th Cir. 1983),
cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1005 (1984).
66. See 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a)(2) (1988); see, e.g., Porcelli, 865 F.2d at 1365; United States v.
Anderson, 782 F.2d 908, 917-18 (11th Cir. 1986).
67. 865 F.2d 1352 (2d Cir. 1989).
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lines sales, although these state tax obligations also were enforced sepa-
rately by means of a distinct RICO forfeiture verdict.6 8
Courts generally have not tempered the broad statutory reach of
RICO's forfeiture provisions, and they have upheld the Justice Depart-
ment's position that such forfeitures are mandatory and give courts no
authority to mitigate the scope of any RICO forfeiture obtained."' In-
deed, the only respite from RICO's forfeiture provisions generally rec-
ognized by federal courts is the eighth amendment's prohibition on
disproportionate punishment.70 While this protection may be of limited
use to criminal defendants, it is of no use to third parties whose prop-
erty interests are enmeshed in a RICO case. Those who have extended
commercial credit to the defendant or who own property jointly with
the defendant must await the outcome of the RICO case to obtain judi-
cial review over their property claims.7 1 These third-party property
owners, although not charged with a crime, have the burden of proof in
a posttrial proceeding to demonstrate that their property interests fit
within the limited statutory exemptions available from the govern-
ment's forfeiture judgment. 2
RICO's forfeiture provisions also permit the government to obtain
court orders barring a RICO defendant from using these presumptively
legal assets prior to trial, even if that wealth is necessary to pay for
pretrial living expenses or to defend against the charges brought.7 3 A
sharply divided Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of using
such pretrial restraining orders to bar a defendant from paying attor-
ney's fees.74 The Second Circuit has gone even further, extending the
government's pretrial RICO authority to include the use of restraining
orders to bar third parties not subject to RICO charges from using their
assets during the pendency of the criminal case. 5
68. Id. at 1355, 1365.
69. See United States v. L'Hoste, 609 F.2d 796, 809 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 833
(1980). See generally Reed, Criminal Forfeiture Under the Comprehensive Forfeiture Act of 1984:
Raising the Stakes, 22 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 747, 753-54 (1985).
70. See, e.g., Porcelli, 865 F.2d at 1366; United States v. Feldman, 853 F.2d 648, 663 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 1164 (1988); United States v. Busher, 817 F.2d 1409, 1415 (9th Cir.
1987).
71. See 18 U.S.C. § 1963(i) (1988) (barring third-party intervention or bringing independent
suit against the United States pending a criminal case). The constitutionality of this provision has
not been tested. See generally Reed, supra note 69.
72. 18 U.S.C. § 1963(l) (1988).
73. Id. § 1963(d).
74. See Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 109 S. Ct. 2646 (1989); United States
v. Monsanto, 109 S. Ct. 2657 (1989).
75. See United States v. Regan, 858 F.2d 115 (2d Cir. 1988).
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a. Fee Forfeiture
The Supreme Court's fee forfeiture opinions are remarkable not
only for their result but also for the reasoning employed by the majority
to reach this result. Criminal forfeiture was introduced into federal law
in 1970 as a RICO sanction;76 by 1989 Congress had enacted criminal
forfeiture as a sanction for a growing number of other criminal of-
fenses, 1 including all drug offenses. 8 From its beginning with RICO,
however, the purpose of criminal forfeiture has been clear-to punish
criminal violators for their criminal conduct.7 9 In 1989, however, the Su-
preme Court's fee forfeiture opinions supplemented the penal purposes
supporting the introduction of criminal forfeiture in 1970 by adding the
objectives of revenue raising for the Justice Department and restitution
for crime victims as legitimate goals for criminal forfeiture.8 0 Criminal
forfeiture, however, was enacted as a new means to punish racketeers; it
was never intended to be a bake sale for the Justice Department.
This remarkable expansion in the legitimate objectives of criminal
forfeiture cannot be traced to any congressional enactment nor to any
practice of the Justice Department. For example, the new "restitution-
ary" objective of criminal forfeiture is not authorized under RICO's for-
feiture provisions, nor is it implemented in practice by the Justice
Department. Simply stated, the Justice Department does not use the
forfeiture laws to provide restitution to the victims of a defendant's
criminal conduct." Indeed, those who typically seek administrative re-
lief from a forfeiture ruling are seeking relief from the government's
76. See Measures Relating to Organized Crime: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Crime of
the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 407 (1969) (statement of Deputy Attor-
ney General Kleindienst) (providing Justice Department support for "revival of the concept of
forfeiture as a criminal penalty" in proposed RICO bill); see also S. REP. No. 225, 98th Cong., 1st
Sess. 82 (1983) (stating that "[flrom that time [1790] until 1970 there was no criminal forfeiture
provision in the United States Code"). See generally Reed & Gill, RICO Forfeitures, Forfeitable
"Interests," and Procedural Due Process, 62 N.C.L. REv. 57, 59-69 (1983).
77. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 982 (1988) (money laundering or currency reporting violations); id. §
1467 (offenses relating to obscene matter); id. § 2253 (sexual exploitation of children or transport-
ing child pornography); id. § 793(h) (transferring or communicating national defense information).
78. Id. § 853.
79. See Organized Crime Control: Hearings on S. 30 and Related Proposals Before Sub-
comm. No. 5 of the House Judiciary Comm., 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 107 (1970) (statement of Sen.
John L. McClellan); see also United States v. Lizza Indus., Inc., 775 F.2d 492, 498 (2d Cir. 1985)
(stating that "[florfeiture under RICO is a punitive, not a restitutive, measure"), cert. denied, 475
U.S. 1082 (1986); United States v. Rubin, 559 F.2d 975, 992 (5th Cir. 1977), vacated and re-
manded, 439 U.S. 810 (1978), reinstated in relevant part, 591 F.2d 278 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 444
U.S. 864 (1979).
80. Caplin & Drysdale, 109 S. Ct. at 2654-55.
81. See 28 C.F.R. pt. 9 (1989) (regulations governing remission or mitigation of criminal for-
feitures; no reference to restitution as a purpose of civil or criminal forfeiture mitigation or remis-
sion decisions).
7031990]
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
action, not from the defendant's action. As the Second Circuit previ-
ously observed: "Forfeiture under RICO is a punitive, not a restitutive,
measure."82 Moreover, in RICO, Congress expressly provided a restitu-
tive remedy for RICO victims: a claim for treble damages against the
defendant.s3 Finally, Congress already has enacted and refined a statu-
tory framework for victim restitution, a system that contains no refer-
ence to government financial involvement in meeting the legitimate
restitutionary needs of victims. 84 The argument that this newly discov-
ered "restitutionary" purpose of criminal forfeiture is merely a deus ex
machina offered to bolster the Supreme Court's intended conclusion in
the fee forfeiture cases is supported by the fee forfeiture cases before
the Supreme Court. These were drug cases, in which victim restitution
would be problematic.
Similarly, the Supreme Court's recognition of a legitimate govern-
ment "pecuniary interest" in maximizing criminal forfeiture in order to
fund the Justice Department's Asset Forfeiture Fund to use forfeiture
proceeds for law enforcement purposes, has no basis in the legislative
history concerning criminal forfeiture. The creation of an Asset Forfei-
ture Fund in 1984 was a congressional reaction to the chronic misman-
agement of seized assets by government agencies, which led to a
situation in which "the sale of forfeited property realizes less than the
expenses incurred by the government in storing, maintaining, and sell-
ing the property, [and] the net loss must be carried by the agency's
budget."' 5 The Asset Forfeiture Fund was created to ensure better
management of seized assets and to reduce the financial burden of this
management on the seizing agency. Thus, this Fund was intended to be
a means of promoting the ends of forfeiture, and not to be an end in
itself. According to the majority opinion in Caplin & Drysdale, how-
ever, the government appears to have a legitimate financial incentive to
maximize forfeiture solely for revenue raising purposes, a goal not tradi-
tionally associated with our criminal process.
b. The Expansion of RICO Forfeiture Law
Wholly apart from the Supreme Court's forfeiture decisions, Con-
gress significantly expanded RICO's forfeiture provisions in the 1980s.
To defeat efforts that frustrated RICO forfeitures through preconvic-
tion transfers, Congress applied the "relation back doctrine" to RICO
82. Lizza Indus., 775 F.2d at 498.
83. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1988).
84. See id. § 3663.
85. S. REP. No. 225, supra note 76, at 197.
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forfeitures in 1984.86 Under the relation back doctrine, the govern-
ment's title to forfeited property relates back to the time when the
property's use violated RICO. 87 This doctrine prevents the defendant
from transferring good title to forfeitable property prior to his
conviction.
Under English common law, the relation back doctrine was limited
to land and did not affect a defendant's chattel. As Blackstone
observed:
Therefore, a traitor or felon may bona fide sell any of his chattels,
real or personal, for the sustenance of himself and family between
the fact and conviction: for personal property is of so fluctuating a
nature, that it passes through many hands in a short time; and no
buyer could be safe, if he were liable to return the goods which he
had fairly bought, provided any of the prior vendors had committed
a treason or felony.88
Congress has not been as accommodating, however, and has not en-
acted any provision to permit a defendant to use his assets to pay for
living expenses or bona fide expenses prior to the verdict. In the wake
of the Supreme Court's unequivocal refusal to recognize an exception to
pretrial restraint or post-trial forfeiture of assets for payment of neces-
sary legal expenses, it is unlikely that RICO defendants have a legal
right to use allegedly forfeitable funds to sustain themselves or their
families pending resolution of the RICO charges.
In addition to placing a defendant's ability to sustain himself or his
family in jeopardy, the relation back doctrine sends a warning signal to
all who have previously dealt with the defendant and those with whom
the defendant will deal in the future. When a RICO indictment is filed,
the defendant becomes a commercial leper: those who previously have
dealt with the defendant cannot be sure that the defendant can per-
form existing contractual obligations or honor future commitments, and
the cloud of a government title claim will hover over completed
transactions.
Significantly, all of these consequences flow from a RICO indict-
ment, not from a conviction. It is not surprising, therefore, that the
mere threat of a RICO indictment can disable a defendant financially,
especially a defendant engaged in an otherwise legitimate business. For
business associates or partners of the defendant, the consequences can
be worse: even though not accused, their assets can be restrained and
their prior transactions turned asunder under the relation back doc-
86. See 18 U.S.C. § 1963(c) (1988).
87. See generally Reed, supra note 69, at 756-57.
88. 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 387-88 (1803).
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trine; moreover, RICO prohibits them from intervening in the criminal
case or filing an independent suit in order to resolve their property dis-
putes.8 9 Thus, these third parties become victims themselves, because
they must wait months or even years for resolution of the government's
claims before they will have a limited statutory opportunity to defend
their property interests."
In 1984 Congress also added an alternative fine provision to RICO,
authorizing judges to impose a fine of up to twice the defendant's gross
criminal profits, as another method to prevent the frustration of forfei-
ture by preconviction transfers.9 1 This alternative fine provision was in-
serted by the Conference Committee in lieu of the Justice Department's
proposal to create a substitute assets forfeiture provision that would
permit the government to confiscate a defendant's legitimate assets if
forfeitable assets were unavailable for forfeiture after trial.92
Thus, by dint of the relation back doctrine, the alternative fine
provision, and enhanced pretrial seizure authority, Congress in 1984 sig-
nificantly strengthened the Justice Department's ability to block any
attempt to frustrate forfeiture through preconviction transfers. The De-
partment was not satisfied, however, and in 1986 persuaded Congress to
adopt the substitute assets forfeiture authority that Congress had de-
clined to grant in 1984.11 This statutory authority almost had become
unnecessary because several federal courts, in the intervening period,
had held that the government could execute a criminal forfeiture judg-
ment by seizure of a defendant's legitimate assets.9 4 As a result of these
events and the overlapping statutory provisions, the Justice Depart-
ment can place a defendant's legitimate and illegitimate assets at risk
in a RICO prosecution.
It is one thing for Congress to reintroduce criminal forfeiture into
the federal criminal code as a valuable means to combat crime by pun-
ishing RICO offenders; it is quite another to embrace criminal forfeiture
laws that would have been considered too harsh for English common
law. The substantial equities that lie in favor of allowing the criminally
accused to use his or her assets for necessary living expenses prior to an
adjudication of the government's allegations more than offset any mar-
ginal interest the government has in imposing punishment upon convic-
89. See 18 U.S.C. § 1963(i) (1988).
90. See id. § 1963(1).
91. Id. § 1963(a).
92. See H.R. REP. No. 1159, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 418-19 (1984) (Conference Report).
93. See 18 U.S.C. § 1963(m) (1988).
94. See, e.g., United States v. Ginsberg, 773 F.2d 798 (7th Cir. 1985) (en banc), cert. denied,
475 U.S. 1011 (1986); United States v. Navarro-Ordas, 770 F.2d 959 (11th Cir. 1985); United States
v. Conner, 752 F.2d 566, 576 (11th Cir. 1985).
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tion. Even under English common law at the time our country was
founded, the king could not render the accused a pauper before proving
him a convict. Because punishment is the true objective of forfeiture, it
is a goal that must await conviction.9 5
The government has ample, duplicative, and overlapping remedies
to thwart preconviction transfers intended to defeat forfeiture upon
conviction. The only possible justification for employing these measures
pretrial to impoverish the accused is a false one: to maximize the finan-
cial recovery of the Justice Department. This justification is unbecom-
ing of a system of criminal justice that purports to be guided by "the
evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing
society.""6
3. Civil RICO
RICO's civil provisions, generally dormant during its first decade,
also have generated great controversy. Private parties first began to use
RICO's civil remedies after federal courts had upheld broad applica-
tions of RICO in criminal prosecutions. Enticed by treble damages and
attorney's fees, plaintiffs' counsel were as resourceful as prosecutors in
using RICO as a blunt instrument against their adversaries. Like fed-
eral prosecutors, civil RICO plaintiffs have relied on the broader RICO
predicates such as the mail and wire fraud statutes to transform com-
mon-law contract and tort suits into RICO violations.97 While these
civil claims fit squarely within RICO's accommodating language, federal
courts and civil defense counsel initially recoiled at this use of RICO. 8
The Supreme Court, however, already was committed to broad, literal
interpretations of RICO when pressed by the government in criminal
prosecutions 9 and continued to interpret RICO's civil provisions
broadly. 100 Moreover, the Supreme Court subsequently resolved practi-
cal issues in civil RICO concerning arbitrability'0' and the statute of
95. See United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 746-48 (1987) (concluding that due process
prohibits punishment prior to conviction).
96. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (Warren, C.J., joined by Black, Douglas, and
Whittaker, J.J.).
97. See generally R.A.G.S. Couture, Inc. v. Hyatt, 774 F.2d 1350, 1355 (5th Cir. 1985).
98. See, e.g., Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 500 (1985) (Marshall, J., dissent-
ing); Furman v. Cirrito, 828 F.2d 898, 903 (2d Cir. 1987), overruled, United States v. Indelicato,
865 F.2d 1370 (2d Cir. 1989); Illinois Dep't of Revenue v. Phillips, 771 F.2d 312 (7th Cir. 1985); cf.
Sun Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Dierdorff, 825 F.2d 187, 196-97 (9th Cir. 1987).
99. See Rusello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16 (1983); United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S.
576 (1981).
100. See, e.g., Sedima, 473 U.S. at 479.
101. See Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987) (stating that
RICO claims are arbitrable).
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limitations,0 2 which removed ambiguities about RICO's use as a civil
litigation weapon. Finally, in 1989, when the Court first construed a
core element of RICO in a civil RICO case, the "pattern" element, the
Court adhered to its prior practice of construing RICO both literally
and broadly. 0 -3
Private use of civil RICO has enabled abortion services providers to
sue their political adversaries, 10 management to sue their labor adver-
saries,10 5 state taxing authorities to sue for treble tax liability,0  and
terminated employees to sue for wrongful discharge. 07 These creative
uses of civil RICO, however, are atypical; the mainstream of civil RICO
litigation continues to be dominated by general fraud claims, sometimes
called "garden variety" fraud. Many of these claims previously were re-
solved in state courts under state common-law principles. Using broad
mail fraud precedent, plaintiffs now can bring these cases in federal
court as RICO suits and avoid many of the common-law limitations on
fraud claims, such as a higher burden of proof'08 or the traditional re-
quirement of proof by the plaintiff of justifiable reliance on the defend-
ant's representations. 0 9 In using the mail fraud provisions to scale
down their burden of proof, private attorneys general under RICO are
following the familiar path of criminal prosecutors who frequently have
used mail fraud to make cases in which other, more specific, criminal
statutes impose more substantial proof burdens. Plaintiffs also use civil
RICO in areas otherwise subject to comprehensive statutory regulation,
such as securities, commodities, bankruptcy, and pension fraud, and
thereby avoid the various statutory limitations on private actions and
remedies in these fields." 0
In short, civil RICO has federalized fraud litigation and has under-
mined various statutory enforcement mechanisms carefully crafted by
Congress to address certain fields of commerce. RICO's proponents, es-
102. Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Assoc., 483 U.S. 143 (1987) (adopting a four-
year limitation period for RICO claims).
103. See H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 109 S. Ct. 2893 (1989).
104. Northeast Women's Center, Inc. v. McMonagle, 868 F.2d 1342 (3d Cir. 1989). See gener-
ally Melley, The Stretching of Civil RICO: Pro-Life Demonstrators Are Racketeers?, 56 UMKC L.
REv. 287 (1988).
105. See Yellow Bus Lines v. Local Union 639, 839 F.2d 782 (D.C. Cir. 1988); MHC, Inc. v.
United Mine Workers, 685 F. Supp. 1370 (E.D. Ky. 1988).
106. Phillips, 771 F.2d at 317.
107. Shearin v. E.F. Hutton, 885 F.2d 1162 (3d Cir. 1989).
108. See Wilcox v. First Interstate Bank of Or., N.A., 815 F.2d 522, 531 (9th Cir. 1987).
109. See, e.g., Armco Indus. Credit Corp. v. SLT Warehouse Co., 782 F.2d 475, 482-83 (5th
Cir. 1986) (indicating that reliance is not necessary for mail fraud); Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v.
Kerr, 637 F. Supp. 828, 834 (W.D.N.C. 1986). But see Brandenburg v. Seidel, 859 F.2d 1179, 1188
n.10 (4th Cir. 1988).
110. See supra notes 56-58.
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pecially Professor G. Robert Blakey, argue that fraud no longer can be
left to state courts and that fraud victims deserve a federal forum and
extraordinary remedies to protect themselves in today's complex
world."' The force of this argument, however, was undermined recently
by the Supreme Court in Tafflin v. Levitt, 1 2 in which the Court noted
that it had full faith "in the ability of state courts to handle the com-
plexities of civil RICO actions." Indeed, the Tafflin opinion observed
that the Supreme Court's prior affirmation of the competency of arbi-
tration panels to resolve civil RICO claims"' would render anomalous
any suggestion that state courts are inadequate for this task. Moreover,
the Tafflin Court's confidence in the ability of state courts to resolve
civil RICO claims was buoyed precisely because many RICO claims deal
with fraud allegations "over which state courts presumably have greater
expertise."1 4 Thus, federal civil RICO cannot be justified on the
grounds that state courts are incompetent to resolve sophisticated fraud
claims; rather, the argument must rest on the claim that state common-
law fraud actions and remedies, by their nature, are inadequate to ad-
dress sophisticated schemes to defraud.
Even if fraud victims currently need federal enforcement, however,
Congress did not think it was designing a federal role in fraud contain-
ment when it enacted RICO in 1970."15 RICO's complex structure was
not aimed at generic fraud; rather, Congress saw the statute as a means
of targeting a specific type of crime: organized crime. 1 6 Congress has
yet to make the judgment that common-law fraud, as enforced in state
court, is inadequate to police modern commerce. No evidence exists
that the 91st Congress was enacting civil RICO in 1970 as a species of
common-law tort reform. Likewise, Congress has yet to make the judg-
ment that a general fraud action is necessary to supplement or supplant
existing federal fraud enforcement schemes.
The absence of a congressionally articulated rationale for civil
RICO, other than the vestigial concern about organized crime, has not
stopped RICO's proponents from trying to supply a rationale. Professor
Blakey, for example, has analogized RICO's objectives to those of the
antitrust laws; instead of promoting competition in interstate com-
merce, however, RICO promotes integrity in interstate commerce."17
111. See Blakey, RICO Debate, 2 CONsT. 33 (1990).
112, 110 S. Ct. 792, 798 (1990).
113. See McMahon, 482 U.S. at 239.
114. Tafflin, 110 S. Ct. at 798.
115. See Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922, 922-23 (1970) (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968
(1988)).
116. See id.
117. Blakey, supra note 111, at 33.
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The Supreme Court, however, recently has suggested that the federal
interest in private RICO enforcement is less compelling than the fed-
eral interest in private antitrust enforcement. In Shearson/American
Express, Inc. v. McMahon"8 the Supreme Court observed that while
antitrust violations "have a widespread impact on national markets as a
whole," most civil RICO claims are aimed only at fraud claims, not or-
ganized crime, thus rendering the need for private enforcement of
RICO "less plausible than it is for the typical antitrust plaintiff."119
Even Justice Byron White, the author of the Supreme Court's broadest
pronouncements on RICO, 2 ' recently suggested that improper state
court construction of RICO's langage was not as dangerous as "im-
proper interpretation of the federal antitrust laws, which could have a
disastrous effect on interstate commerce, a particular concern of the
federal government."'' The Supreme Court obviously has not placed
private enforcement of RICO on the same level of importance as it his-
torically has attributed to antitrust enforcement.
Fraud, however, may well have a negative impact on interstate
commerce sufficient to invoke a federal policy interest that is not being
adequately addressed by state causes of action. If fraud, as Professor
Blakey has argued, is a multibillion dollar business, then a compelling
case can be made that the victims of such fraud deserve a federal rem-
edy. Congress, however, has not yet made that policy judgment. Even if
Congress concluded that such federal statutory action was necessary, it
has never examined RICO to determine whether RICO's complex statu-
tory structure is suitable for this task.
Because Congress has never examined carefully the validity of the
currently articulated rationale for civil RICO, federal courts must han-
dle the practical consequences of expansion of civil RICO without the
benefit of congressional guidance. Courts have become increasingly hos-
tile to civil RICO because it increases and complicates their workload,
prompting federal judges to lend their voices to the call for RICO
reform.122
The federal government also has used civil RICO to take over orga-
nizations. Using civil RICO, the federal government has taken over lo-
cal labor unions and asserted control over the Teamsters, the largest
labor union in America. These actions, prompted by civil allegations
that organized crime dominates these unions, effectively have disen-
118. 482 U.S. 220 (1987).
119. Id. at 241-42.
120. Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479 (1985); United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S.
576 (1981).
121. Tafflin, 110 S. Ct. at 800 (White, J., concurring).
122. See Rehnquist, supra note 5, at 9-13.
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franchised the rank and file union members because the government or
its designates manage the affairs of these unions. It is no surprise that
the membership would rankle under such direct government domina-
tion; in the first local placed under a government trusteeship,123 the first
free election brought victory for the slate associated with the previously
deposed leadership. The government, however, did not stop at taking
over the union in that case. Instead, the government brought a subse-
quent civil RICO suit against the trucking firm that had collective bar-
gaining contracts with the local and sought to invalidate the prior
contracts and impose new collective bargaining agreements. 124 Thus,
through civil RICO the government has arrogated to itself the power to
displace both labor and management at the bargaining table and to en-
force involuntary labor agreements on both sides.
III. REFORM EFFORTS
A. Congressional Reform Efforts
Many voices have called for RICO's repeal or reform, creating a
consensus that the status quo is no longer acceptable. The momentum
for a re-examination of RICO, however, has not been consistent. Most
pressures for reform have come from appeals for exemption by specifi-
cally affected interest groups willing to let the RICO juggernaut proceed
as long as they are placed out of harm's way.
The pending Senate reform bill, Senate Bill 438,-25 is a classic ex-
ample of reform by exemption: it contains nothing more than a series of
special interest exemptions from civil RICO aimed at placating numer-
ous lobbying groups, which thus hope to opt out of the RICO prob-
lem. "'6 These special interest groups, including the securities, insurance,
and banking lobbies, carefully have distanced themselves from any ef-
fort to rein in the use of RICO by criminal prosecutors. Rather, they
hope to restrict reform to civil RICO and particularly to themselves and
thereby achieve a limited repeal of civil RICO as applies to them. 27
123. United States v. Local 560, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 780 F.2d 267 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
476 U.S. 1140 (1986).
124. United States v. New England Motor Freight, Civ. 88-4396 (Oct. 13, 1988) (case was
settled).
125. S. 438, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990).
126. Id.
127. Some of these special interests, however, have a legitimate point: if Congress enacts
comprehensive statutory enforcement mechanisms over a regulated industry such as the securities
field, including private enforcement provisions, Congress should not, by accident, create a differ-
ent, and more powerful, private cause of action applicable to the industry. If Congress accepts this
position, however, it should at least consider whether existing statutory enforcement mechanisms
are fulfilling their original mission. For example, the banking, securities, and commodities indus-
tries have distinguished themselves in recent years through widespread allegations of misconduct,
1990]
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
The irony of the "reform" package reflected in Senate Bill 438 is
that the Senate bill, spurred to curtail the overbreadth of RICO, pro-
poses more than two dozen new predicate offenses," 8 even though the
Justice Department is not seeking the addition of these predicates. In a
transparent trade-off, Senators can appear tough on crime while offer-
ing relief to selected civil RICO defendants.
The House Subcommittee on Crime, however, currently is consid-
ering more meaningful reform. Representative William J. Hughes, who
chairs that subcommittee, has indicated that he is contemplating legis-
lation that would codify the pattern definition articulated in H.J. Inc.
v. Northwestern Bell Telephone Co.' 29 His draft bill also would intro-
duce a gatekeeper concept whereby trial judges screen each civil RICO
case filed to determine whether it is properly within the ambit of
RICO. °30 These changes, while providing a refreshing acknowledgement
that RICO needs substantive reform, nonetheless fail to address the
root causes of RICO's overbreadth. For example, codifying the pattern
definition formulated by the H.J. Inc. majority is not a logical response
either to the majority or to the concurring opinion in that case. The
H.J. Inc. majority offered an admittedly underdeveloped pattern defini-
tion but indicated that further clarity must await future case law or
greater precision from Congress.'' Congress should heed this invita-
tion. The H.J. Inc. concurring opinion caustically described the major-
ity's pattern definition as being as instructive as "life is a fountain.' ' 32
Codification of H.J. Inc.'s pattern definition will not add greater clarity
to RICO's pattern definition nor will it significantly narrow RICO's
scope.
The gatekeeper concept, while perhaps a useful device for limiting
civil RICO, will do nothing to limit RICO's use in criminal prosecutions.
Indeed, the premise of a gatekeeper provision-that civil RICO should
be limited to misconduct sufficiently egregious to fall within the range
of conduct Congress intended RICO to reach-is tantamount to a con-
fession by Congress that RICO's current language is inadequate for this
task. With a gatekeeper provision, the only difference between criminal
and civil RICO prosecutions is that the Justice Department can employ
fully RICO's overbroad language, but civil plaintiffs must establish that
their case is the type of case Congress fully intended RICO to cover. 33
hardly a compelling basis upon which to argue for a reduction in private enforcement tools.
128. S. 438, supra note 125.
129. 109 S. Ct. 2893, 2899-2905 (1989).
130. Hughes Draft RICO Bill (source on file with Vanderbilt Law Review).
131. H.J. Inc., 109 S. Ct. at 2902.
132. Id. at 2907.
133. See id. at 2905. This double standard is particularly ironic because the Supreme Court
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The gatekeeper concept demonstrates that Congress is willing to trust
the Justice Department with an open-ended criminal statute whereas it
is unwilling to vest such discretion in private plaintiffs. This double
standard, while politically understandable, reaffirms the original intent
of Congress to enforce RICO in a discriminatory fashion.
The draft gatekeeper limiting language is indicative of the nagging
problem that has plagued RICO from its inception: how to limit RICO's
reach without creating a vague status offense. For example, Congress is
considering a draft of the gatekeeper bill under which a trial court,
upon the filing of a civil RICO complaint, must determine whether the
conduct alleged is of the sort Congress intended civil RICO to reach:
"organized crime and major white collar crime, when such crime has as
its objective large economic gain through fraudulent or coercive prac-
tices or improper governmental influence."'' I 4 If the court concludes
that the plaintiff's claim does not further this objective, then the claim
may be sanctionable as a "frivolous" RICO suit.
Linking RICO liability to the amorphous phrase "white-collar
crime" is a candid acknowledgement of RICO's metamorphosis from a
measure aimed at organized crime to an all purpose prosecutorial vehi-
cle for complex or sophisticated crime. This development has occurred
because of RICO's versatility, and not because of congressional intent.
Unfortunately, the term "white-collar" crime is as ill-defined as "organ-
ized crime." Placing such a burden of proof on a private civil RICO
plaintiff at the commencement of a RICO suit is problematic because,
absent a definition for white-collar or organized crime, the plaintiff
faces the disadvantage of not knowing what is necessary to plead or
prove a claim. In addition, limiting such a burden of proof to civil RICO
plaintiffs suggests that Congress did not intend to place a similar bur-
den on the government. Hence, while private plaintiffs are reined in by
the white-collar or organized crime limitation on civil RICO, federal
prosecutors are free to apply RICO in any context falling within the
statute's literal and accommodating reach. Ironically, civil defendants
are offered the protection of a limiting principle, however vague, on
RICO's reach, but criminal defendants must parse RICO's commodious
language to ascertain whether Congress intended RICO to penalize
their conduct. Thus, a defendant may be criminally liable under RICO
for conduct that would not justify a private civil enforcement suit. This
result may be a windfall for civil defendants but it is a loss to private
and the lower federal courts already have abandoned any effort to divine true congressional intent
in RICO. They have chosen instead a literalist approach whereby courts simply apply RICO's
"commodious language" regardless of the result. Id. at 2904; Furman v. Cirrito, 828 F.2d 898, 903
(2d Cir. 1987); R.A.G.S. Couture, Inc. v. Hyatt, 774 F.2d 1350, 1355 (5th Cir. 1985).
134. Discussion Draft of Oct. 18, 1989, House of Representatives.
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plaintiffs victimized by a RICO violation.
This policy debate over the pressing need to limit civil RICO has
yet to focus on the real cause of RICO's overbreadth: the broad and
elastic nature of its component parts. Civil RICO derives its breadth
from the breadth of criminal RICO. A civil RICO claim depends on the
establishment of a criminal RICO violation. The breadth of the under-
lying criminal RICO offense and its elastic elements make RICO a for-
midable and versatile weapon for private or government counsel.
Recognition that RICO's problems lie in the overbreadth of its core ele-
ments is essential to any meaningful reform effort.
B. The Justice Department Guidelines
The Justice Department, secure in its belief that few politicians are
willing to curtail RICO and risk appearing soft on organized crime, has
tried to head off any significant reduction in its RICO powers by tout-
ing its own self-restraint and by supporting civil RICO limitations.
1. The Tax Fraud Guideline
To demonstrate its self-restraint, the Department in 1989 promul-
gated new "Guidelines" applicable to RICO prosecutions. 13 5 The first
change concerned the use of RICO to prosecute tax fraud.36 In the
Princeton/Newport'3 7 case, prior to the new Guidelines, federal prose-
cutors were permitted to prosecute defendants under RICO for tax
fraud, even though tax fraud is not a RICO predicate, by the expedient
and common method of charging tax fraud activity as a mail fraud vio-
lation."" Soon after the verdict in the Princeton/Newport case, how-
ever, the Justice Department promulgated new Guidelines, indicating
that absent various exceptions, the Department would not authorize the
use of mail fraud as a surrogate for tax fraud in order to bring a RICO
case.' 9 These Guidelines are not binding on the government, 4 0 but the
Department has offered them as examples of the self-restraint it exer-
cises in bringing RICO prosecutions. This new tax policy was inter-
preted widely as a response to the criticism the government received for
135. U.S.A.M., supra note 28.
136. Id.
137. United States v. Regan, 713 F. Supp. 629 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).
138. See id.; see also United States v. Porcelli, 865 F.2d 1352 (2d Cir.) (finding state sales tax
violations as mail fraud predicates), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 53 (1989); United States v. Busher, 817
F.2d 1409, 1412 (9th Cir. 1987) (finding federal tax violations as mail fraud predicates).
139. See U.S.A.M., supra note 28, § 6-4.211(1) (as amended by letter of July 3, 1989 of Shir-
ley D. Peterson, Assistant Attorney General, Tax Division).
140. See Busher, 817 F.2d at 1411-12 (indicating that RICO Guidelines are not enforceable);
U.S.A.M., supra note 28, § 1-1.100.
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prosecuting the Princeton/Newport tax fraud case under RICO and
seeking RICO forfeiture of more than fifteen million dollars in defend-
ants' partnership/enterprise assets for tax evasions of approximately
sixty thousand dollars. When the defendants were sentenced, however,
the government indicated that the Princeton/Newport prosecutions fit
within the newly promulgated Guidelines,"' and the sentencing court
concurred, observing that the new tax fraud Guideline "does not bar
this or future tax fraud and mail fraud charges from being brought
under the RICO statute.' 142
2. The Temporary Restraining Order Guideline
The new Guideline on authorization to seek pretrial restraining or-
ders, promulgated at about the same time as the tax fraud Guideline,
offers little comfort either to defendants or to affected third-party
property owners. '4 The Justice Department openly acknowledged that
this Guideline was promulgated because "[s]ome highly publicized cases
involving RICO TROs have been the subject of considerable criticism in
the press, because of a perception that pretrial freezing of assets is tan-
tamount to a seizure of property without due process.' 44 Ironically, for
years it was the federal courts, and not the press, that had rejected the
government's contentions in RICO litigation that defendants and third
parties had no due process rights to prevent or mitigate broad pretrial
restraining orders sought by the government.145 Despite this almost uni-
form judicial rejection, it was the press that stirred the Department to
promulgate a Guideline. The Guideline adopted did not commit the De-
partment to affording any due process safeguards in court, but indi-
cated prior Department authorization was necessary before a line
prosecutor could seek a pretrial restraining order from the court.' 46
The new Guideline further indicates that the Organized Crime and
Racketeering Section, which conducts all internal RICO authorizations,
141. Regan, 713 F. Supp. at 629.
142. United States v. Regan, 726 F. Supp. 447, 455 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).
143. See U.S.A.M., supra note 28, § 9-110.414 (as amended by letter from Edward Dennis,
Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division (June 30, 1989)).
144. Letter from Edward Dennis, Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division (June 30,
1989).
145. Reed, supra note 69, at 761-63, 781-82; Reed & Gill, supra note 76, at 83-94; see, e.g.,
United States v. Harvey, 814 F.2d 905, 928-29 (4th Cir. 1987); United States v. Crozier, 777 F.2d
1376 (9th Cir. 1985); United States v. Lewis, 759 F.2d 1316, 1324-25 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 474
U.S. 994 (1985); United States v. Long, 654 F.2d 911, 915-16 (3d Cir. 1981); see also United States
v. Thier, 801 F.2d 1463, 1466-70 (5th Cir. 1986); U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, HANDBOOK ON THE COMPRE-
HENSIVE CRIME CONTROL ACT OF 1984, at 44-45 (construing § 1963(e) as a congressional rejection of
prior due process precedent requiring an evidentiary hearing before issuance of pretrial restraining
orders). But see United States v. Musson, 802 F.2d 384 (10th Cir. 1986).
146. U.S.A.M., supra note 28, § 9-110.414.
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would consider any anticipated impact that forfeiture and the TRO
would have on innocent third parties. 1' The Guideline states further
that "the government's policy is not to seek the fullest forfeiture per-
missible under the law where that forfeiture would be disproportionate
to the defendant's crime."' 48 While this nonbinding denial of a govern-
ment policy to maximize forfeiture in all cases is a worthy government
aspiration, the government has not taken such a generous stance when
such matters are raised in court. In Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v.
United States,49 for example, the government contended, and the Su-
preme Court agreed, that the ."strong government[al] interest in ob-
taining full recovery of all forfeitable assets" overrides any sixth
amendment interest criminal defendants might have in using their pre-
sumptively legitimate assets to pay for their criminal defense. 5 ' In ad-
dition, the Supreme Court sustained the government's argument that it
had a legitimate pecuniary interest in forfeiture favoring recovery of
"all forfeitable assets" for potential subsequent use in the government's
law enforcement efforts.151 Thus, contrary to the aspirational policy lan-
guage in the RICO Guidelines, the Justice Department successfully has
fought in court for the right to maximize its forfeiture recovery before
and after trial, even if only for general revenue raising purposes, as op-
posed to penal purposes.
In light of the enactment of separate criminal forfeiture provisions
during the 1980s for several RICO predicates, the question becomes
whether RICO's forfeiture provisions are necessary. As previously ex-
plained, RICO's broad authorization of enterprise forfeiture raises
unique eighth amendment proportionality concerns. When the govern-
ment has a number of other criminal forfeiture sanctions available, es-
pecially those under the broad federal money laundering statutes,5 2 the
continued need for broad RICO enterprise forfeitures is certainly less
compelling. For example, under the federal money laundering statutes,
the government may secure the forfeiture of any proceeds of any RICO
predicate.'53 Because the government can claim these illicit proceeds di-
rectly without proving the existence of a RICO enterprise or a pattern
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. 109 S. Ct. 2646 (1989).
150. Id. at 2655.
151. Id. at 2654 (emphasis in original).
152. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956, 1957 (1988) (relating to substantive money laundering offenses);
id. § 981 (authorizing civil forfeiture for money laundered assets); id. § 982 (relating to criminal
forfeiture of property used in or traceable to money laundering).
153. See id. § 1956(7)(A). In fact, the head of the Justice Department's Asset Forfeiture
Office recently announced that: "Federal prosecutors see the future in 18 U.S.C. § 1956. They don't
see the future in RICO." 4 CORP. CRIME REP. no. 10, at 2 (March 12, 1990).
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of racketeering activity, RICO's forfeiture provisions are no longer nec-
essary to trace the flow of illicit money. Thus, the remaining benefit to
the government from RICO's forfeiture provisions is the enhancement
of the government's ability to obtain enterprise forfeiture-the forfei-
ture of a defendant's interests in a legitimate business regardless of
whether those assets were acquired illegally."5 4 Both the courts and the
Justice Department have expressed concern about the potential over-
breadth of this forfeiture language in RICO that allows the government
to reach legally acquired assets. 5' Accordingly, RICO's unique enter-
prise forfeiture provisions are also its most controversial. Because the
"profits of crime" are equally subject to forfeiture under the much sim-
pler money laundering statute, a legitimate issue arises whether RICO's
forfeiture provisions are either obsolete or constitutionally suspect.
3. Problems with the Guidelines
Reliance on the Justice Department's RICO Guidelines is mis-
placed because the Guidelines are not enforceable in court, and they are
riddled with exceptions. Certainly the Organized Crime and Racketeer-
ing Section of the Justice Department faithfully has attempted to en-
force the Guidelines. For bureaucratic and political reasons, however,
the regional United States Attorneys offices have not hesitated to assert
their autonomy on decisions to bring RICO charges. Often such charges
arise in high profile cases, and local federal prosecutors are reluctant to
subject themselves to the letter or spirit of the Guidelines that might
jeopardize an important prosecution. The RICO Guidelines, while well
intentioned, are no substitute for legally enforceable limitations on the
reach of RICO. The existence of the Guidelines is a tacit admission by
the Justice Department that RICO's literal language is overbroad, and
that prosecutors should not take RICO to its literal limits. Federal
courts, on the other hand, have not hesitated to employ a liberal ap-
proach to RICO.
154. An argument could be made that forfeiture under § 1963(a)(1) is more expansive than
the forfeiture available under § 982(a) and thus the government might have a broader stake in
pursuing forfeiture under § 1963(a)(1). Because federal courts have not yet interpreted the scope
of the language in § 982(a) authorizing forfeiture of "any property, real or personal, involved in [a
money laundering] offense, or any property traceable to such property," it is premature to specu-
late on which forfeiture statute is broader. Id. § 982(a).
155. See United States v. Porcelli, 865 F.2d 1352, 1364-66 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct.
53 (1989); United States v. Busher, 817 F.2d 1409, 1414-15 (9th Cir. 1987); U.S.A.M., supra note 28,
§ 9-110.414.
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4. Joinder Under RICO
The Justice Department also has defended RICO on the ground
that it provides the prosecution with joinder possibilities that are not
available under other criminal provisions. Specifically, the government
argues that RICO enables it to join multiple claims and defendants in
one suit when joinder otherwise could not be accomplished. 5 ' It is not
clear that the degree of joinder available under RICO, however, is any
greater than that available under federal conspiracy law. 157 For exam-
ple, an agreement among defendants to commit multiple criminal acts
under the auspices of a legitimate entity probably would be within the
reach of conspiracy law, thus eliminating the need to invoke RICO for
criminal liability purposes. RICO's only potential joinder benefit is the
joinder of wholly illicit associations of criminals; the government claims
that RICO enables it to join the little fish with the big one in prosecut-
ing group criminality.158 The government's "big fish, little fish" justifi-
cation for RICO, however, appears to be more like a desire to engage in
"drop net fishing."
Traditional conspiracy law, however, already has served the
prosecutorial need for joinder well. Firmly established conspiracy doc-
trine declares that the conspirators need only a tacit agreement and a
general knowledge of each other's existence. 159 Moreover, the govern-
ment invariably charges a RICO conspiracy in real organized crime
prosecutions and appears willing to assume the burden of proving a
conspiratorial agreement, albeit a diffuse one, in organized crimes cases.
The benefit of RICO over conspiracy in this limited area of RICO pros-
ecutions appears to lie not in joinder, but in the diluted proof required
to establish a defendant's knowledge of the activities of other joined
defendants. At some point, however, a defendant's knowledge of the ac-
tivities of criminal associates might be so de minimis that traditional
conspiracy law might preclude joinder while RICO conspiracy doctrine
might tolerate joinder. If so, then RICO adds a modest element of join-
der not available under conspiracy law, but this would apply only to
persons peripherally related to a crime organization.
The RICO joinder provisions are only marginally more beneficial
156. See Dennis, Current RICO Policies of the Department of Justice, 43 VAND. L. REv. 651,
653 (1990).
157. See, e.g., United States v. Toro, 840 F.2d 1221, 1238 (5th Cir. 1988) (stating that "sepa-
rate conspiracies with different memberships may be joined if they are part of the same series of
acts or transactions").
158. See Dennis, supra note 156, at 653-54.
159. See, e.g., Blumenthal v. United States, 332 U.S. 539, 557 (1947); United States v. Mas-
ters, 840 F.2d 587, 592 (8th Cir. 1988); United States v. Donsky, 825 F.2d 746, 753-54 (3d Cir.
1987).
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than those available under modern conspiracy law.160 Moreover, in or-
ganized crime prosecutions in which the government has invoked
RICO's supposed joinder advantages most often, the government has
antagonized judges, juries, and defendants with the practical burdens
associated with such multiple defendant RICO "mega-trials."'' RICO's
joinder capabilities have become a burden to the government, particu-
larly in organized crime cases. The longest RICO megatrial, United
States v. Accetturo,'6 2 lasted twenty-one months and resulted in not
guilty verdicts for all twenty defendants on all seventy-seven counts, a
remarkable verdict given that the defense case lasted for less than one
day. The Second Circuit, in the so-called Pizza Connection Case,1 63 re-
cently suggested prospective rules that decidedly favor severance over
joinder of defendants for RICO cases expected to last more than four
months.164 Thus, for the marginal joinder advantages that RICO offers,
the burdens associated with enhanced joinder have caused many practi-
cal problems for prosecutors, including the increased hostility of the
judges and juries that must suffer through these lengthy proceedings.
5. Sentencing Guidelines
Finally, the Justice Department values RICO because the statute
affords the government the ability to display the "big picture" of organ-
ized criminality." 5 This big picture, however, will come to the attention
of the sentencing judge under the new Sentencing Guidelines. These
Guidelines require that a defendant's criminal conduct be disclosed, ex-
amined, and weighed for purposes of computing an appropriate sen-
tence. 6 Under the Sentencing Guidelines, the severity of a RICO
sentence should be no different than a conspiracy conviction for the
same offenses, if the offenses are grouped together. 61 Moreover, in-
creased periods of confinement generally will fall upon the white-collar
offender as a result of the Sentencing Guidelines. In the federal Sen-
tencing Guidelines, the Sentencing Commission has implemented a de-
liberate policy of increasing incarceration for economic crimes such as
160. But see Lynch, supra note 11, at 952-53.
161. See United States v. Casamento, 887 F.2d 1141 (2d Cir. 1989); United States v. Gallo,
668 F. Supp. 736 (E.D.N.Y. 1987).
162. 783 F.2d 382 (3d Cir. 1986).
163. Casamento, 887 F.2d at 1147.
164. Id. at 1152.
165. See Dennis, supra note 156, at 671.
166. See Sentencing Guidelines § 1B1.3 (1990).
167. Id. § 3D1.2(d). A possible exception could occur with a different base level offense. See
id. § 2Xl.1 (stating that conspiracy offenses are subject to the same base offense level as object
offense for conspiracy).
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fraud, insider trading, and theft,' thereby increasing deterrence of
white-collar crime through stiff mandatory sentencing, which is ad-
vanced regardless of RICO's presence in the penal code. Accordingly,
with or without RICO, the big story will be told to the court, and the
defendant's sentence will not be enhanced substantially by adding
RICO charges.
C. The Overbreadth of RICO
The government has used RICO effectively in its fight against or-
ganized crime since the mid-1980s. The government's recent success
against organized crime is equally attributable, however, to an increased
allocation of prosecutorial resources and to an increased use of elec-
tronic surveillance, transactional immunity, and witness protection. The
money laundering statutes,169 the broadened mail fraud statute,170 and
the sentencing guidelines soon may eclipse RICO as the prosecutor's
weapon of choice against organized crime. The question then becomes
whether RICO, with all its attendant problems, is a necessary weapon
to combat organized crime, or whether a narrower statute is
appropriate.
In Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co.'" the Supreme Court isolated the
problem of civil RICO's overbreadth as the "breadth of the predicate
offenses ...and the failure of Congress and the courts to develop a
meaningful concept of 'pattern.' ,,172 The Court acknowledged that
RICO's troubling overbreadth is due to the overinclusive nature of
criminal RICO and its elements. In Sedima and in H.J. Inc. v. North-
western Bell Telephone Co.'73 bare majorities of the Supreme Court
declined to reform or to restrict RICO, preferring to place this task
upon Congress. Justice Scalia's pointed concurrence for four Justices in
H.J. Inc. has made it apparent, however, that the Court's patience with
Congress is dwindling. Unfortunately, Congress does not appear willing
to examine the root cause of RICO's overbreadth-its elastic elements.
In his concurring opinion Justice Antonin Scalia focused on a potential
constitutional cure for the ills of RICO: the "void for vagueness" doc-
trine. The following section will analyze how Justice Scalia's prescrip-
tion may be just the tonic that RICO reform needs.
168. U.S. SENTENCING COMMISSION, FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1.8 (1990).
169. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956, 1957 (1988).
170. Id. § 1346.
171. 473 U.S. 479 (1985).
172. Id. at 500.
173. 109 S. Ct. 2893 (1989).
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IV. RICO AND THE VOID FOR VAGUENESS DOCTRINE'7 4
In H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Telephone Co.'75 Justice Scalia
penned a concurring opinion practically inviting a constitutional chal-
lenge to the statutory term "pattern" of racketeering activity. Justice
Scalia's concurrence, joined by Chief Justice William Rehnquist and
Justices Sandra Day O'Connor and Anthony Kennedy, is remarkable
for several reasons. First, Justice Scalia's comments were completely
volunteered; the litigants in H.J. Inc. had not made a vagueness chal-
lenge to RICO's pattern element.7 6 Second, a judicial determination
that RICO's pattern element is constitutionally defective would under-
mine the validity of hundreds of convictions, forfeitures, and civil judg-
ments. It is remarkable that four Justices of the Supreme Court not
only would entertain, but also openly suggest such a challenge. Third,
Justice Scalia failed to acknowledge a substantial body of lower court
precedent that has rebuffed vagueness challenges to RICO in the early
days of its judicial interpretation. At a minimum, Justice Scalia's con-
currence revitalizes the argument that the constituent elements of
RICO are unconstitutionally vague.
Justice Scalia's unusual concurrence was prompted by his acknowl-
edged inability to "provide an interpretation of RICO that gives signifi-
cantly more guidance concerning its application" than the majority
opinion gave. 177 According to Justice Scalia, the majority opinion in
H.J. Inc. provides as much guidance to potential defendants about how
to avoid RICO liability as the advice "life is a fountain.' 1 7 8 Justice
Scalia concluded: "That the highest Court in the land has been unable
to derive from this statute anything more than today's meager guidance
bodes ill for the day when [a vagueness] challenge is presented.' 79
As defense counsel continue their search for a RICO Achilles' heel,
this invitation by Justice Scalia may soon rival footnote fourteen in
Sedima as the most litigated RICO attack. In particular, the "con-
tinuity" element of the H.J. Inc. pattern definition is ripe for a vague-
ness challenge. Since the H.J. Inc. decision, federal appellate courts
have held that four month 80 and one year'8 ' periods are insufficiently
174. The discussion of vagueness is adapted from D. SMITH & T. REED, CIVIL RICO (1989). It
is used with permission of the publisher, Matthew Bender.
175. H.J. Inc., 109 S. Ct. at 2906 (Scalia, J., concurring).
176. Id. at 2909. The frequency with which the Supreme Court volunteers possible constitu-
tional infirmities in a federal statute is rare indeed.
177. Id. at 2908.
178. Id. at 2907.
179. Id. at 2909.
180. Parcoil Corp. v. Nowsco Well Serv., Ltd., 887 F.2d 502 (4th Cir. 1989).
181. Fiorentino v. Converse, 16 RICO L. REP. 563, 564 (3d Cir. 1989).
1990]
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
continuous to constitute a pattern of racketeering activity. With these
differing periods, it will be difficult, if not impossible, for ordinary peo-
ple to know at what point their activity crosses the pattern threshold.
While the H.J. Inc. concurrence was directed at the vagueness as-
sociated with RICO's pattern element, other essential elements of RICO
are equally subject to challenge on vagueness grounds. For example, the
nexus requirement in actions brought under section 1962(c), which re-
quires a relationship between a RICO defendant's criminal conduct and
the RICO enterprise, has generated imprecise judicial interpretations.' s2
The nexus requirement is not defined in section 1961, RICO's defini-
tional section. Moreover, "the statute itself does not specify 'the degree
of interrelationship between the pattern of racketeering and conduct of
the enterprise's affairs.' ,183 Courts have employed two distinct tests,
the Scotto test or the Cauble test, to define RICO's nexus requirement.
In United States v. Scotto,8 4 the Second Circuit held that the nexus
requirement is satisfied either when the defendant is enabled to commit
the predicate offenses solely because of the defendant's position in the
enterprise or when the predicate offenses are related to the activities of
the enterprise. Conversely, in United States v. Cauble,'l 5 the Fifth Cir-
cuit rejected the Scotto test and formulated a nexus test that required
proof of (i) the commission of predicate offenses, (ii) the defendant's
position in the enterprise facilitated by his or her commission of these
predicates, and (iii) that "the predicate acts had some effect on the law-
ful enterprise."'' s These distinct tests are very ambiguous. In both cir-
cuits, however, the government need not prove that the defendant's
predicate offenses benefited the enterprise in any way.' How a defend-
ant's conduct "affects" an enterprise under the Cauble test or is related
to the affairs of the alleged enterprise under the Scotto test is largely
undefined. Although the Cauble and Scotto tests are clearly different
tests' 88 and appellate courts are divided over which test to apply, they
are both ambiguous. 89 For example, the Fifth Circuit's nexus definition
requires only that a defendant's conduct must "affect" an enterprise. 19
182. See cases cited infra note 189.
183. United States v. Robilotto, 828 F.2d 940, 947 (2d Cir. 1987) (quoting United States v.
Scotto, 641 F.2d 47, 54 (2d Cir. 1980)), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1011 (1988).
184. 641 F.2d 47, 54 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 961 (1981).
185. 706 F.2d 1322 (5th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1005 (1984).
186. Id. at 1332-33.
187. See Cauble, 706 F.2d at 1333 n.24; Scotto, 641 F.2d at 54.
188. See Robilotto, 828 F.2d at 948 (comparing Cauble to the Second Circuit test); United
States v. Carter, 721 F.2d 1514, 1527 n.16 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 819 (1984).
189. Compare United States v. Blackwood, 768 F.2d 131, 138 (7th Cir.) (Cauble test), cert.
denied, 474 U.S. 1020 (1985) with Robilotto, 828 F.2d at 940 (Scotto test) and United States v.
Provenzano, 688 F.2d 194, 200 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1071 (1982) (Scotto test).
190. See Cauble, 706 F.2d at 1322.
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Indeed, the D.C. Circuit has demonstrated recently the vagueness of the
two competing nexus tests by confusing them as the same test.19' The
complexity of RICO may inspire vagueness challenges to RICO in its
entirety.
Impermissibly vague criminal laws have two vices. First, because
we believe people are "free to steer between lawful and unlawful con-
duct, we insist that laws give the person of ordinary intelligence a rea-
sonable opportunity to know what is prohibited,"'"" so that they may
conform to what is lawful. The requirement of fair notice is essential to
due process because "[n]o one may be required at peril of life, liberty or
property to speculate as the meaning of penal statutes."' 3 The second
vice of vague penal statutes is that they delegate "basic policy matters
to policemen, judges, and juries for resolution on an ad hoc basis, with
the attendant dangers of arbitrary and discriminatory application.' ' 94
It is this latter vice, the danger of discriminatory enforcement, that
the Supreme Court has labeled "the more important aspect of the
vagueness doctrine."' 95 When the legislature fails to provide minimal
guidelines to govern law enforcement officials, "a criminal statute may
permit 'a standardless sweep [that] allows policemen, prosecutors, and
juries to pursue their personal predilections.' "196 Such a result would
confer lawmaking authority on the executive or judiciary branches,
rather than on the legislative branch. As the Supreme Court remarked
more than a hundred years ago:
It would certainly be dangerous if the legislature could set a net large enough to
catch all possible offenders, and leave it to the courts to step inside and say who
could be rightfully detained, and who should be set at large. This would, to some
extent, substitute the judicial for the legislative department of government.1 97
Accordingly, the "void for vagueness" doctrine also plays a role in plac-
ing the sole responsibility for defining federal crimes on Congress. 98
191. See Yellow Bus Lines, Inc. v. Drivers, Chauffeurs & Helpers Local Union 639, 839 F.2d
782, 793 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
192. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 (1972).
193. Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451, 453 (1939) (holding a state statute that criminal-
ized being a "gangster" invalid as unconstitutionally vague).
194. Grayned, 408 U.S. at 108-09.
195. Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 358 (1983).
196. Id. at 358 (quoting Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 575 (1974)).
197. United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214, 221 (1876), quoted in Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S.
352, 358 n.7 (1983).
198. In United States v. Kozminski, 108 S. Ct. 2751 (1988), the Supreme Court identified the
purposes of the rule of lenity as promoting fair notice, minimizing selective or arbitrary enforce-
ment, and maintaining the proper balance between Congress, prosecutors, and the courts. Id. at
2764. The Kozminski opinion reaffirmed that federal crimes are defined by Congress and suggested
that the Court would not "tolerate the arbitrariness and unfairness of a legal system in which the
judges would develop the standards for imposing criminal punishment on a case-by-case basis." Id.
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The substantial notice and discriminatory enforcement issues
presented by RICO call into question the continued validity of numer-
ous cases rejecting vagueness challenges to RICO. While the number of
circuit and district court opinions upholding RICO charges against
vagueness challenges is impressive, 99 the reasoning of these decisions is
not persuasive.
Most courts rejected vagueness challenges by citing early criminal
RICO precedents in which courts perfunctorily dismissed such chal-
lenges.20 Most of these early circuit court opinions occurred in criminal
cases decided long before the judiciary developed an interpretation of a
RICO "pattern" requiring proof of continuity and relationship between
the alleged predicate acts. In fact, these early RICO cases employed
pattern definitions that could be considered both crude and overbroad
in the wake of Sedima2 01 and H.J. Inc. 202 The rationales under which
these courts rejected vagueness challenges are no longer valid. For ex-
ample, in United States v. Campanale, °3 the Ninth Circuit, to its
credit, responded to a vagueness challenge with the observation that "it
is true that, if undefined, terms such as 'pattern of racketeering activ-
ity' would be unmanageable. '20 4 The Campanale opinion went on to
conclude, however, that any ambiguity is cured by RICO's definitional
section, section 1961, which provides general definitions for "racketeer-
ing acts," a "pattern," an "enterprise," and a "person." The problem
with this reasoning is that the definition of a pattern of racketeering
activity adopted in H.J. Inc. is not set forth in section 1961, but, as
Justice Scalia acerbically noted in his concurrence, is rooted in the lan-
guage of a different statute. °0 Finally, these earlier rulings did not have
the benefit of Justice Scalia's concurring opinion in H.J. Inc. with its
pointed criticism of the persistent ambiguity of the statutory term
"pattern," which exists despite the best efforts of the lower courts and
the majority opinion in H.J. Inc. to define the term. The questionable
reasoning of these lower court precedents should not be a substantial
obstacle to a more careful examination of the application of the vague-
ness doctrine to RICO or its constituent elements.
199. See, e.g., United States v. Morelli, 643 F.2d 402, 412 (6th Cir. 1981); United States v.
Aleman, 609 F.2d 298 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 946 (1980); United States v. Huber,
603 F.2d 387 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 927 (1980); United States v. Campanale, 518
F.2d 352 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1050 (1976); United States v. Stofsky, 409 F. Supp.
609 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), aff'd, 527 F.2d 237 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 819 (1976).
200. See, e.g., United States v. Tripp, 782 F.2d 38, 42 (6th Cir. 1986).
201. Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479 (1985).
202. H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 109 S. Ct. 2893 (1989).
203. 518 F.2d 352 (9th Cir. 1975).
204. Id. at 364.
205. H.J. Inc., 109 S. Ct. at 2907.
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A. Vagueness and the Pattern Element
After H.J. Inc. the ability of RICO's "pattern" element to with-
stand a direct "void for vagueness" challenge is open to question. In
Newmyer v. Philatelic Leasing, Ltd.2 °0 the vagueness challenge to
RICO's pattern element was raised for the first time on appeal. The
Sixth Circuit declined to entertain this challenge because "proper reso-
lution of the question of RICO's constitutionality is not beyond any
doubt, and no injustice would result from allowing the issue to be ad-
dressed in the first instance by the district court. ' 07 Justice Scalia's
invitation to challenge the constitutionality of RICO was clear. Perhaps
more telling is the failure of the five-member majority in H.J. Inc. to
allude to the vagueness issue, even though they supported a broad, im-
precise, judicial definition of the pattern element. 08
Although the majority in H.J. Inc. specifically disagreed with Jus-
tice Scalia's concurrence on other issues,20 9 they offered no response to
Scalia's jarring suggestion that the majority's handiwork merely con-
firmed the unconstitutional vagueness of the statute. The majority of-
fered this candid confession:
The limits of the relationship and continuity concepts that combine to define a
RICO pattern, and the precise methods by which relatedness and continuity or its
threat may be proved, cannot be fixed in advance with such clarity that it will
always be apparent whether in a particular case a "pattern of racketeering activity"
exists. The development of these concepts must await future cases, absent a deci-
sion by Congress to revisit RICO to provide clearer guidance as to the Act's in-
tended scope.210
This confession by the H.J. Inc. majority may reflect only the de
rigueur plea to Congress to clarify the intended scope of RICO. 21' The
majority's confession that the definition it provided lacked sufficient
clarity to be useful in any given case is significant because Justice
Scalia needed only one more vote to raise his doubts about the vague-
ness of the pattern element into a holding. In this context, the major-
ity's reference to the need for congressional clarification of the scope of
RICO's pattern element may be more a threat than a suggestion. In-
deed, Representative William J. Hughes, Chair of the House udiciary
Subcommittee, which has jurisdiction over RICO reform efforts, has
aptly described the H.J. Inc. opinion as a shot across the bow of Con-
206. 888 F.2d 385 (6th Cir. 1989).
207. Id. at 399.
208. H.J. Inc., 109 S. Ct. at 2900-02.
209. See, e.g., id. at 2902 n.4 (disagreeing with the concurring opinion's observation that
Congress intended RICO to reach short term racketeering activity).
210. Id. at 2902.
211. See, e.g., Sedima, 473 U.S. at 499.
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gress.21 2 The majority opinion's alternative suggestion, to await future
judicial clarification, runs counter to the principle that there is no fed-
eral common law of crime.213
The cleavage of the Supreme Court on this issue also is relevant to
the success of any future vagueness challenge. The concurring Justices
in H.J. Inc., Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justices O'Connor, Scalia,
and Kennedy, are not viewed generally as soft on crime or criminals.
Justice O'Connor, however, has authored a leading vagueness opinion in
Kolender v. Lawson,1 4 in which she upheld a vagueness challenge to a
California loitering and identification law. In a recent case, United
States v. Kozminski,1 5 Justice O'Connor also rejected the suggestion
that judges could "develop the standards for imposing criminal punish-
ment on a case-by-case basis." '
In a state RICO opinion handed down in the same term as H.J.
Inc., Fort Wayne Books, Inc. v. Indiana,1 7 three of the Justices in the
H.J. Inc. majority, Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens, described
RICO's "pattern" definition as only compounding the "intractable
vagueness" of the underlying predicate offense of obscenity.218 Thus, at
least seven Justices have alluded to the potential vagueness problems
inherent in RICO's pattern element. Some may argue that any vague-
ness problems can be cured by future judicial clarifications. Indeed the
H.J. Inc. majority noted that the development of the "concepts" of con-
tinuity and relatedness "must await future cases. 2 1 9 In United States
v. Kozminski,220 however, the Supreme Court observed:
It is one thing to recognize that some degree of uncertainty exists whenever judges
and juries are called upon to apply substantive standards established by Congress;
it would be quite another thing to tolerate the arbitrariness and unfairness of a
legal system in which the judges would develop the standards for imposing criminal
punishment on a case-by-case basis.
21
212. See Address by Representative William J. Hughes, Vanderbilt Law Review Symposium
(Nov. 11, 1989); see also Hughes, RICO Reform: How Much Is Needed?, 43 VAND. L. REv. 639
(1990).
213. See United States v. Hudson & Goodwin, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32 (1812).
214. 461 U.S. 352, 358 (1983).
215. 108 S. Ct. 2751 (1988).
216. Id. at 2764. The other H.J. Inc. concurring Justices, as well as Justice White, joined this
opinion.
217. 109 S. Ct. 916 (1989).
218. Id. at 931, 934 (Stevens J., joined by Brennan and Marshall, JJ., dissenting). Justice
Stevens observed that, "[i]ronically, the legal test for determining the existence of a pattern of
racketeering activity has been likened to 'Justice Stewart's famous test for obscenity-"I know it
when I see it"-set forth in his concurrence in Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964).' "Id. at
934 n.14.
219. H.J. Inc., 109 S. Ct. at 2902.
220. 108 S. Ct. 2751 (1988).
221. Id. at 2764.
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B. Vagueness Challenges to RICO As a Whole
While the H.J. Inc. opinion dealt only with RICO's pattern ele-
ment, and Justice Scalia's concurrence was aimed directly at the major-
ity's attempt to provide a clear definition for this element, potential
vagueness problems may afflict RICO generally. RICO's potential for
lack of notice or discriminatory enforcement challenges is not tied
solely to the imprecision of its "pattern" element. RICO criminalizes
certain relationships between individuals, their conduct, and some "en-
terprise;" RICO is distinct because it purports to elevate certain crimi-
nal conduct to a more serious offense when it occurs within these
criminal relationships. Given the complexity of these various relation-
ships, it may be argued that vagueness infects the entire statute.
A vagueness challenge to RICO as a whole must address the Su-
preme Court's reasoning in the recent case, Fort Wayne Books, Inc. v.
Indiana.222 In Fort Wayne Books Justice White, writing for a majority,
which included Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Blackmun, Scalia,
and Kennedy, rejected a vagueness challenge to the obscenity predicate
offenses under Indiana's state RICO statute.23 Justice White found no
merit in the vagueness challenge because he found no vagueness in the
underlying obscenity statute. Specifically, Justice White asserted:
"Given that the RICO statute totally encompasses the obscenity law, if
the latter is not unconstitutionally vague, the former cannot be vague
either. ' 224 Justice White elaborated on this truncated reasoning in foot-
note seven, explaining that Indiana's RICO statute was "more limited"
in scope than the state's obscenity laws because it required proof of a
"pattern" of obscenity. Because the State must prove that "all the ele-
ments of an obscenity offense are present, and then some," Justice
White concluded that RICO was not unconstitutionally vague as ap-
plied in obscenity prosecutions. 25
Justice White's reasoning in Fort Wayne Books may be read as re-
quiring a rejection of vagueness challenges to RICO when the underly-
ing predicate offense is not unconstitutionally vague. In dicta, the Fort
Wayne Books majority opinion mused that the pattern element
"seemed" to make RICO less vague.226 This broad reading of Fort
Wayne Books is difficult to accept both logically and in light of Justice
Scalia's concurrence in H.J. Inc.
First, Justice White's explanatory footnote is an exercise in ques-
222. 109 S. Ct. 916 (1989).
223. Id. at 924-25.
224. Id. at 925.
225. Id. at 925 n.7.
226. Id.
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tion begging. Even if the underlying predicate offense of obscenity is
not vague, the vagueness analysis then focuses on what are the "and
then some" elements that clearly differentiate this defendant's conduct
from the conduct of those who merely commit obscenity offenses. For
example, the predicate offense of murder is not unconstitutionally
vague, but this does not mean that those who commit two murders are
placed on notice that they are guilty of racketeering. In United States
v. Aleman 227 the government convicted two defendants under RICO for
engaging in three home burglaries. The Aleman opinion rejected a
vagueness challenge on the theory that the defendants joined together
to form an association: an enterprise.228 The defendants obviously had
notice that burglary is a crime; whether they knew what constituted the
"and then some" element that might also violate the federal RICO stat-
ute is a separate question.
Justice White's suggestion that the "pattern" element would
"seem" to make the RICO statute inherently less vague did not escape
the attention of Justice Stevens, writing in dissent and joined by Jus-
tices Brennan and Marshall. Justice Stevens labeled this argument a
"non sequitur. ' 229 According to Justice Stevens, RICO's reference "to a
'pattern' of at least two violations only compounds the intractable
vagueness of the obscenity concept itself. '230 Justice Stevens rejected
the Court's construction of the RICO statute because it would require
"nothing more than proof that a defendant sold or exhibited to a will-
ing reader two obscene magazines." 231 Justice Stevens indicated he
would find such a statute "unconstitutional even without the special
threat to First Amendment interests posed by" RICO's remedies. 23 2
Four months after Fort Wayne Books, the Supreme Court issued
its opinion in H.J. Inc.233 The Court focused on the breadth of civil
RICO and, in particular, the role of the "pattern" element in circum-
scribing RICO's reach. Three of the four Justices who joined Justice
White's assertion in Fort Wayne Books that RICO's "pattern" element
"would seem" to make RICO less vague expressed doubts about
whether RICO's pattern definition would pass constitutional muster
when challenged for vagueness. 234 The three dissenting Justices in Fort
227. 609 F.2d 298 (7th Cir. 1979).
228. Id. at 305.
229. Fort Wayne Books, 109 S. Ct. at 934 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
230. Id.
231. Id.
232. Id.
233. 109 S. Ct. 2893 (1989).
234. Fort Wayne Books, 109 S. Ct. at 925 n.7. Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Kennedy
joined Justice Scalia in his H.J. Inc. concurring opinion and were part of the Fort Wayne Books
majority. H.J. Inc., 109 S. Ct. at 2906. Justice O'Connor, who also joined in Justice Scalia's concur-
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Wayne Books who contended that RICO's "pattern" element com-
pounded the constitutional vagueness defects in the obscenity statute
joined the majority in H.J. Inc.23 5
It is difficult to reconcile the shifting allegiances of these Supreme
Court Justices as they considered the same issue in different cases only
four months apart. A plausible, if superficial, explanation is that these
swings in voting reflect an underlying force that has driven RICO juris-
prudence from the beginning: judicial views on RICO are affected by
whose ox is being gored in any particular case. In Fort Wayne Books,
for example, Justice Stevens's antipathy to RICO and his vagueness
concerns may have been rooted in his longstanding view that almost all
obscenity prosecutions are unconstitutional, and that RICO only exac-
erbates the inherent vagueness defects of such prosecutions. 23 6 A vote
against RICO's use in obscenity prosecutions, however, does not extend
necessarily to a vote against civil RICO entirely because Justice Stevens
joined the majority opinions in both Sedima and H.J. Inc.
Chief Justice Rehnquist, on the other hand, does not share Justice
Stevens' reservations about obscenity prosecutions, but he recently has
made known his reservations about the widespread use of civil RICO
and the resulting increase in the judicial workload. 2 " A vote against
civil RICO on vagueness grounds, especially a nonbinding vote, might
be appealing whereas a vote against RICO obscenity prosecutions might
not. This superficial explanation for the Supreme Court's divided loyal-
ties on the issue of RICO's potential vagueness is not satisfactory. If
pressed, courts will have to reconcile Fort Wayne Books and H.J. Inc.
A simplistic reconciliation of the conflicting vagueness positions be-
tween Fort Wayne Books and the concurrence in H.J. Inc. is that Fort
Wayne Books controls because it is a majority opinion, not a mere con-
currence. This resolution, however, fails to recognize that three of the
five members of the Fort Wayne Books majority were also members of
the concurring opinion in H.J. Inc. More importantly, the rationale of
the H.J. Inc. concurring opinion-that RICO's "pattern" element is
constitutionally suspect because undefined-is irreconcilable with the
reasoning employed by the Fort Wayne Books majority.
rence in H.J. Inc., dissented from the relevant portion of Fort Wayne Books on jurisdictional
grounds. Fort Wayne Books, 109 S. Ct. at 930. Justice Blackmun, the only Justice to join both the
Fort Wayne Books and the H.J. Inc. majority opinions, issued a concurring opinion in Fort Wayne
Books indicating that he did not believe the Court had jurisdiction but did concur in the judgment
of the majority that obscenity predicates could form the basis of a RICO conviction. Id. at 930.
2:35. Justices Brennan and Marshall joined Justice Stevens's dissent in Fort Wayne Books,
109 S. Ct. at 931, but these three joined the majority in H.J. Inc., with Justice Brennan authoring
the majority opinion. H.J. Inc., 109 S. Ct. at 2893.
236. See Fort Wayne Books, 109 S. Ct. at 934-35 n.15.
237. See Rehnquist, supra note 5.
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If Fort Wayne Books stands for the proposition that RICO is im-
mune from a vagueness challenge when the underlying RICO predicate
is not unconstitutionally vague, then the vagueness of RICO's pattern
element is irrelevant and the concurring Justices in H.J. Inc. were in-
dulging in idle speculation about a matter ostensibly already resolved in
Fort Wayne Books. Certainly, the bribery predicate offenses in H.J.
Inc. were as sufficient, and possibly clearer, from a vagueness perspec-
tive as the obscenity predicates in Fort Wayne Books. If the only
vagueness issue for RICO was the constitutional sufficiency of predicate
violations, the rumblings of the H.J. Inc. concurrence would be mis-
placed, because the concurring Justices there were confronted with
nonvague bribery predicate allegations.
Alternatively, if Fort Wayne Books stands for the proposition that
RICO's pattern element renders RICO less vague because it defines the
"and then some" element that catapults a mere criminal into a racket-
eer, then the H.J. Inc. concurring opinion represents a radical challenge
to the accuracy of this conclusion. Because three of the five Justices
who formed the Fort Wayne Books majority would make this challenge,
this interpretation of Fort Wayne Books should be rejected.
The dissenters in Fort Wayne Books, Justices Stevens, Brennan,
and Marshall, may have been persuaded to join the majority in H.J.
Inc. because the definition of pattern provided therein was presump-
tively sufficient to survive a vagueness challenge, which might save
RICO from a vagueness defect.2 38 This argument, however, cannot be
sustained by the H.J. Inc. majority opinion, which assiduously avoided
any direct discussion of potential vagueness problems. This silence is
inexplicable given the pointed nature of the concurring opinion. This
argument also is undermined by the H.J. Inc. majority's confession that
the pattern definition it provided lacked clarity that might be provided
in the future by case law or by Congress.
The shifting allegiances, demonstrated by the voting of the Justices
in the Fort Wayne Books and H.J. Inc. decisions, are not confined to
the Supreme Court. The development of RICO jurisprudence has been
marked by an initial judicial receptivity to broad interpretation of
RICO in criminal prosecutions that has given way to an increased skep-
ticism about RICO's reach in civil cases. One possible explanation for
this judicial dissonance is that some federal judges believe that al-
though federal prosecutors are using RICO discriminately, private at-
238. For example, in Fort Wayne Books, Justice Stevens appears to criticize the majority for
interpreting RICO's pattern element as requiring only two obscenity violations. Fort Wayne
Books, 109 S. Ct. at 934. The substantial gloss placed on the pattern element in H.J. Inc. may have
allayed some of Justice Stevens's concerns about the use of the pattern element as a limiting con-
cept in RICO cases. See H.J. Inc., 109 S. Ct. at 2899-2900.
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torneys cannot be trusted to invoke RICO only in proper cases. Under
traditional vagueness doctrine, however, this should make RICO more,
not less, suspect. Courts should not rely on the prosecution to deter-
mine the appropriate ambit of a criminal sanction; this is a task consti-
tutionally assigned to Congress. Discriminatory enforcement is a
dangerous vice of imprecise penal laws.
One possible response to a vagueness challenge to RICO or its con-
stituent elements is that any notice deficiencies afflicting the statute are
cured by requiring a specific intent mens rea. The Supreme Court has
upheld statutes against vagueness challenges on the ground that the
specific intent requirement assures that a defendant will not be held
liable unless he knowingly and willfully commits the offense.239 An ini-
tial defect in this argument is that many courts have held that RICO is
not a specific intent crime and requires no more showing of mens rea
than that required by the underlying predicate offenses.240 While im-
posing a specific intent requirement on RICO may alleviate potential
notice problems, it still would leave considerable discretion in the hands
of the prosecution for discriminatory enforcement.
The "void for vagueness" doctrine may prove a useful vehicle
through which federal courts may accomplish what Congress has not:
narrowing RICO and its constituent elements. Under the "void for
vagueness" doctrine, the Court may be asked to revisit prior RICO pre-
cedent to determine whether the various judicial glosses placed on the
broad literal language of RICO render the statute sufficiently precise to
avoid the evils of lack of notice or discriminatory enforcement. Finally,
because vagueness challenges are typically available only on an as ap-
plied, as opposed to facial, basis,2 4 courts would retain flexibility in
redefining the proper scope of RICO.
The Porcelli 42 case provides an example of how such challenges
could operate to narrow RICO. In Porcelli the federal government used
RICO to prosecute the owner of a gas station chain for failure to pay
state sales tax.2 43 Oddly enough, failure to pay state sales tax was not a
crime under applicable New York law.2 4 The Second Circuit observed
that "prosecution of a state sales tax evader for a RICO violation
239. See, e.g., Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 103 (1945); Hygrade Provision Co. v.
Sherman, 266 U.S. 497, 502-03 (1925); United States v. L. Cohen Grocery Co., 255 U.S. 81 (1921).
240. See, e.g., United States v. Biasucci, 786 F.2d 504, 512 (2d Cir. 1986); United States v.
Pepe, 747 F.2d 632, 675-76 (11th Cir. 1984); United States v. Romano, 684 F.2d 1057, 1065 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1016 (1982); United States v. Boylan, 620 F.2d 359, 361-62 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 449 U.S. 833 (1980).
241. See Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 756 (1974).
242. United States v. Porcelli, 865 F.2d 1352 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 53 (1989).
243. Id.
244. Id. at 1357.
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pushes that law to its outer limits." 2 5 Nonetheless, the Second Circuit
upheld the prosecution of these state sales tax delinquencies as federal
mail fraud violations under the strained reasoning that failure to pay
the sales tax deprived the State of New York of its property right to
bring a civil tax enforcement action. 46 As a result, Mr. Porcelli was
convicted under RICO and ordered to forfeit the amount of tax out-
standing, approximately four million dollars, and all his affiliated gaso-
line corporations, which were more than worth twice that amount. It is
unlikely that the defendant had notice that failure to pay state sales tax
would make him a RICO violator subject to these substantial penalties.
The potential for discriminatory enforcement of RICO is palpable, and
it is likely that Mr. Porcelli was the victim of discriminatory
enforcement.
The Porcelli opinion came down in January 1989, six months
before Justice Scalia penned his concurrence in H.J. Inc. After H.J.
Inc. and Fort Wayne Books, RICO's critics hope Congress and the
courts will be emboldened to look anew at RICO's use. Because it is
unlikely that Congress will narrow substantially RICO's core criminal
elements, courts should heed Justice Scalia's invitation to re-examine
RICO under the void for vagueness doctrine and narrow its reach.
V. CONCLUSION
A general consensus has emerged that RICO "is developing into
something quite different from the original conception of its enac-
tors. ' 247 The blame for this metamorphisis ultimately must rest with
Congress, the body responsible for RICO's language and its breadth.
While the federal judiciary is partially responsible for the breadth that
RICO has assumed in its first twenty years, that a continuing dispute
exists over RICO's actual or intended scope must be charged to the
body whose intent RICO is supposed to embody-Congress. Unfortu-
nately, for a variety of reasons, Congress has never mustered the politi-
cal will to undertake meaningful reform.
In the absence of congressional action, the courts should parse
carefully the language provided by Congress to determine if RICO is
sufficiently precise to survive a vagueness challenge. In doing this,
courts should reject the double standard that often has attended crimi-
nal and civil RICO claims: courts should place criminal claims under
the same scrutiny as civil claims. In practice, however, federal judges
have been loath to restrict federal prosecutors' use of criminal RICO
245. Id. at 1355.
246. Id. at 1361-62.
247. Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 500 (1985) (referring to civil RICO).
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but many have outdone themselves in finding ways to limit private use
of the same statute.
In the early days of RICO's interpretation, it was perhaps under-
standable that courts would reject vagueness and other challenges to
RICO, especially when confronted with the defendants carefully se-
lected by the Justice Department. On the criminal side, however, RICO
has become almost obsolete, as federal prosecutors have been equipped
with many new tools, such as the money laundering laws, the broadened
forfeiture laws, and the Sentencing Guidelines that can and probably
will displace RICO. Consequently, judicial fear that tinkering with
RICO will substantially undermine law enforcement is largely mis-
placed. In this new environment, the courts should accomplish what
Congress has failed to do: place reasonable limits on RICO's reach.

